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LAWYERING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
IN THE 1990s
HAROLD A. McDOUGALL *
INTRODUCTION
F OR the 1990s, we need a working model for practicing and teaching
law in a "post-modem" legal system.' This is not a model limited to
federal court litigation, but rather examines three branches (judicial, leg-
islative, and executive/regulatory) and three levels (federal, state, and lo-
cal) of government operating in a state of dynamic equilibrium.
The dynamic equilibrium of the post-modem legal system is character-
ized by a number of tensions and conflicts. One is a tension between
regulation and deregulation. Another is a conflict between rights secured
by ownership of property (the "Old Property"2) and rights secured by
government subsidy and regulation (the "New Property"'). Yet another
is a tension between tightly focused advocacy by "special interests"4 and
* B.A., Harvard College 1967, J.D. Yale, 1971; Associate Professor and Director,
Clinical Program in Law and Public Policy, Catholic University of America. I wish to
thank the AALS Section on Clinical Legal Education's 1990 Annual Conference and the
Clinical Theory Workshop at Columbia University Law School for affording me the op-
portunity to speak on the juxtaposition of public policymaking and the public interest.
These engagements and the ensuing responses helped me refine my thinking on these
topics. I also wish to thank my colleagues Ron Collins and Peter Kahn for criticism and
comments, and the students in my Law and Public Policy class, particularly Susan Engel-
man and Michele Reifsnyder Danilowicz, for their research and their opinions. Of
course, all the mistakes are mine.
1. See N. Reich, Reflexive Law and Reflexive Legal Theory: Reflections on
Postmodernism in Legal Theory (April 1988) (paper delivered at Bremen) (copy on file
with author).
"Post-modern" is a term used to describe the legal system arising from extensive gov-
ernment intervention in and regulation of the economy, generally characteristic of the
legal systems of all advanced industrial democracies in the period since World War II..
See generally Handler, Dependent People the State and the Modern/Postmodern Search
for the Dialogic Community, 35 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 999 (1988)(discussing the various theo-
ries about the "modern social welfare state," New Property, administrative bureaucracy
and regulation, post-modern ethics, and the views of the Critical Legal Studies and Legal
Realism movements). Cf. also Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism. and the New
Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 Cornell L Rev.
811, 816 n.16 (1990)("modern" refers, inter alia, to the "process of secularization and
rationalization giving rise to new modes of thought such as rationalism, liberalism, and
positivism")(citing D. Kellner, Critical Theory, Marxism, and Modernity 3-4 (1989)).
2. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
3. See generally, C. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964)(exploring the
relationship between individual wealth and the individual's relationship to government).
See also infra text accompanying notes 102-04 (New Property holders are private prop-
erty owners who benefit from government subsidies, licenses and regulations).
4. "Special interest" advocates are those who seek to promote the advancement of
rights secured by the Old Property over the New Property. See infra note 104 and ac-
companying text.
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the need to promote the widely "diffused interests" of the general public5
in quality-of-life issues such as civil rights and civil liberties, peace, envi-
ronmental quality, consumer protection, and adequate health care.
The equilibrium is driven by both conflict and cooperation among pub-
lic interest advocates,6 special interest advocates, and institutional actors
in all branches of government.7 To date, special interest advocates and
institutional actors have generally dominated this equilibrium. This Ar-
ticle will attempt to explain why public interest advocates have had lesser
influence, and will sketch the type of theoretical training and professional
development which will be necessary to prepare public interest advocates
to be more effective.
In thinking of this new model, there are three overall topics to con-
sider. Part I of this Article discusses the need for a theoretical perspec-
tive from which to describe and analyze our post-modern legal system.
Part II considers the need for a pragmatic perspective from which to
generalize about how our post-modern legal system operates.' Part III of
this Article examines the need for a working model of legal practice,
informed by the theoretical and pragmatic perspectives developed, to ex-
amine the work of public interest advocates representing social move-
ments in a post-modern legal system. This Article concludes that legal
educators must train their students to respond to the public interest legal
system of the 1990s.
5. See N. Reich, supra note 1, at xxv; infra note 106 and accompanying text.
Generally speaking, the diffuse interests of the public can only be articulated coher-
ently by a social movement which emerges to press the issue-civil rights, or environmen-
tal quality, or peace, for example. Public interest advocacy organizations often become
the lobbyists or litigators for such social movements.
The relationship between public interest organizations and social movements is a dy-
namic and often uncertain one, requiring the student to develop an understanding of
social movements, of public interest organizations, and of the relation between the two.
See generally McDougall, infra note 9 (describing how lawyers make decisions regarding
public policy); infra text accompanying notes 183-92 (regarding the role of social move-
ments in public interest activities).
6. See supra note 5.
7. Institutional actors in the government include all manner of elected and ap-
pointed government officials in the legislative, judicial, regulatory, and executive branches
and their respective staff.
8. For a discussion of a new theory of "legal pragmatism," see Farber, Legal Prag-
matism and the Constitution, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 1331, 1331-32 (1988). "Pragmatism"
describes a general movement of scholars away from "foundationalism," that is, the at-
tempt to construct a theory justifying judicial review, and toward an approach to legal
problems which "uses every tool that comes to hand, including precedent, tradition, legal
text, and social policy." Id. See also West, The Limits of Neopragmatism, in Symposium
on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1747,
1747 (September 1990)(discussing the limits of neopragmatism). Further discussion of
the theory of legal pragmatism is beyond the scope of this article.
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I. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON A POST-MODERN LEGAL SYSTEM
A. The Langdellian Model and Its Critics
In a previous article, 9 I discussed the gap between theory and practice
which developed as Dean Langdell worked to create a model for the
study of law which was sufficiently "academic" for his Harvard Univer-
sity colleagues in the Arts and Sciences. 10 To render the study of law
more academic, Langdell created a model which focused almost entirely
on the analytical component of appellate court decisionmaking. The im-
pact of Langdell's model on the study and practice of law was profound.
First, Langdell's examination of law and related theories evolved
through the use of abstract models which presented law as a closed sys-
tem, susceptible to study through the use of linear thinking." Second,
the practice of law, caught up in the concreteness and chaos of real life,
became an art engaged in by the "seat of one's pants" unless actually
arguing before an appellate tribunal. Only then did there seem to be any
relation between the abstraction of the law and the concreteness and par-
ticularity of society.12 Third, the theoretical and practical aspects of
dealing with legislation and regulation were greatly underemphasized, if
not altogether ignored.
Ironically, just as the study of law was moving away from the con-
creteness, incoherence, and uncertainty experienced by practitioners, the-
ories were developing in the physical sciences that were capable of
accounting for such experience. These theories of physical relativity had
their corollaries in the jurisprudence of the Legal Realists, who rose to
challenge Langdell's model.' 3
B. From Realism to "Policy Science"
One of the most important contributions of the Legal Realists was to
demonstrate that social life cannot be "deduced" from abstractions such
as legal doctrine.14 This raised a two-pronged inquiry: By what process,
9. The article got started as I observed a method of practice among Washington
lawyers that I had never seen or studied before. It simply did not fit the classroom model.
I was charged with the responsibility of creating an academic model with which to study
and teach about this phenomenon, and so I set out to develop a theory.
The first step was McDougall, Lawyering and Public Policy, 38 J. Legal Educ. 369
(1988) [hereinafter Lawyering], describing how these lawyers made decisions. The second
step was McDougall, Social Movements Law, and Implementation, 75 Cornell L Rev. 83(1989) [hereinafter Social Movements], a description of how these lawyers make up a
system of law and policy implementation.
10. McDougall, Social Movements, supra note 9, at 87-88.
11. See id. at 86-88.
12. On the separation and connection between linear, "left-brain" thinking and em-
pathetic "right-brain" thinking, see discussion, infra text accompanying notes 202-07.
13. One of the Realists' most important contributions here was the idea of clinical
education. See generally Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. Pa. L Rev.
907 (1933)(a clinical legal education is the best way to qualify people to practice law).




other than by intellectual deduction, do such abstractions shape social
life? 15 And further, how in turn is the abstraction of legal doctrine like-
wise shaped by social life itself?
Myres McDougal, in a 1947 address to the Yale Law School, described
Legal Realism as a movement which had established that legal doctrine
was meaningful only when regarded as a set of tools, used in the context
of community processes, to effect or justify a particular distribution of
values.1 6 Before Realism, the Formalists who held sway viewed law and
legal doctrine simply as a "set of technical symbols," rather than as the
"whole of a community's institutions of government, both formal and
real-the sum of all the power decisions of the community."17 For the
Formalists, the function of law was to maintain order rather than to
orchestrate the production of community values. Law's primary official
was the judge, and little concern was shown for the legislative or admin-
istrative branches. And clearly, the lawyer's role was that of a technician
only, rather than the manager of the wide assortment of decisions which
comprise the social process of identifying, producing, allocating and dis-
tributing value. 8
While congratulating his Realist colleagues on their decisive break
with Formalism, McDougal also challenged them. He urged them to
move beyond their critique of formalism and turn to "Policy Science," a
new curricular approach. McDougal felt the new approach was needed
to prepare students for the legal issues arising in the post-New Deal (i.e.,
"post-modern") era, in which law would manage, rather than merely
tinker with, social life. McDougal promised that policy science would
15. See generally Clune, A Political Model of Implementation and Implications of the
Model for Public Policy, Research, and the Changing Role of Law and Lawyers, 69 Iowa
L. Rev. 47 (1983)(discussing "implementation," which is the design of government policy
to effect social change).
16. McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy Science
in the World Community, 56 Yale L.J. 1345, 1345 (1947).
17. Id. at 1348. McDougal saw law not merely as a set of technical symbols, but
instead as an expression of the reciprocal framework within which conflict was moder-
ated and managed, if only because of the duality or reciprocal nature of all law. See
McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy-oriented Approach, 1 Nat. L. F. 53, 62
(1954). Legal doctrine in this sense only describes patterns of restraint previously agreed
upon by coalitions that may or may not remain actively regenerating those patterns, or
that may have disintegrated completely. Law-prophets then arrange for the public wor-
ship of these reified patterns, without reference to the historical, political, economic con-
texts in which they were created.
"The language of authoritative myth is not adequate to the descriptive task because it
does not make clear and discriminating reference to the events that precipitate decision,
the variables that affect decision, or the effects of decision." Id. at 62. Of course, that
does not mean such myths cannot be used to affect decision itself. One would ignore such
power at one's peril. Id.
Reconsider the meaning of "legal drafting" in this context-it is the arrangement of
words which wield power. Under such circumstances, it is important for the drafter to be
connected to the processes which create and arrange power relationships, and the values
which are the object of such processes.
18. McDougal, supra note 16, at 1348.
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make the necessary connections between law and society, between the
abstract and the concrete, between theory and practice. Legal Realism as
a merely critical exercise could not equal policy science in this respect.
To appreciate the importance of the opportunities and obligations of
the post-modem era, it was only necessary for McDougal to review the
lack of social understanding from whence the nation had come, By 1947,
an understanding of "psychology and personality, of how the human
mind works[,]"' 9 had begun to develop slowly, with only slight "insight
into group behavior, social processes and community institutions."2"
As a consequence of this knowledge, and of the events of the Great
Depression and World War II, the nation had moved beyond a time
when private enterprise could act "free of any deep concern about its
future,"21 when wealth could be pursued without regard to the effect
such pursuit might have upon the community, and without regard as to
how the community might respond.' We could no longer pursue power
without regard for the "stability of the framework" in which power was
acquired.23 Enlightenment, respect and morality could no longer be pur-
sued in atomistic fashion, without regard for the quests of others or for
how the collection of such individually rational quests might, somehow,
add up to collectively irrational results.24
Policy science, McDougal hoped, would put together what we knew
about law and what we knew about social life, and help us begin to func-
tion as a community. 2 As a community, there were some urgent
problems we would have to face: (1) "to preserve our domestic strength
and prevent economic depression;" (2) "to preserve our power position
* . . in the world community;" and (3) "to inhibit the growth of anti-
democratic forces, 'the elements that destroy human dignity,' at home as
well as abroad."26
Unfortunately, McDougal himself did not complete the project of ana-
lytically and practically connecting legal knowledge with the knowledge
of social life. Instead, he confined himself to creating broader and more
flexible definitions. He did not, in the sphere of domestic policy, actually
apply these definitions in a sufficiently concrete way to put his models in
motion. Thus, his work became inaccessible to most students.2 7 To real-
ize the potential McDougal saw for policy science, a curriculum would
19. Id at 1346.




24. See id. See also Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 Yale LJ.
472, 493-97 (1980)(on strength, intelligence, etc., as socially/collectively produced (and,
by rights, owned)).
25. See McDougal, supra-note 16, at 1347-49.
26. Id. at 1348.
27. The contrary might be said of his work on international policy, which had a de-
cidedly goal-oriented-and rather conservative-energy.
1991]
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have to be designed which provided students with the opportunity to
both study and participate in the process by which abstract legal doc-
trines are first transformed into judgments, laws and regulations, and fi-
nally, into patterns of living for real people in real life.
C. "'Legal Process" Displaces Policy Science
Generally speaking, the attempt to develop a policy science curriculum
was not taken up by Yale or any other school. It was not until Hart and
Sachs at Harvard began to move away from the strict study of appellate
court opinions, and began to study the legislature and the bureaucracy as
well, that a theory might develop that could describe the legal process in
a way that reflected McDougal's concerns. Hart and Sachs' study of the
institutional character of each of the three branches of government, and
of the interaction among them, was called the "Legal Process" approach,
and was an important step beyond the Formalism McDougal disparaged.
By considering the interactions among the bureaucracy, the legisla-
ture, and the judiciary, Hart and Sachs' "Legal Process" approach ena-
bled the law for the first time to be studied as an open rather than closed
system.2" Legal Process analysis opened the door for an investigation of
the open-ended reasoning processes which characterize legislative and
bureaucratic activity. As a corollary, the use of open-ended reasoning by
courts could also now be explored.
Hart and Sachs had a tiger by the tail, however. They were generally
unable to develop theories to cope with the randomness and incoherence
of the post-modern legal system. They began developing models of how
each branch of government acted and reacted, but could not develop new
ways of thinking about lawyering-about the development of law from
abstract legal doctrines and the implementation of law into patterns that
affect social life.29
Because of these shortcomings, the Legal Process project never
progressed beyond a life as a set of duplicated materials for use at
Harvard Law School. But the as yet unanswered challenge of Policy Sci-
ence to connect theory, legal structure and social life was taken up by
three different "schools of thought" in legal education, all associated
with the 1960's and 1970s. These three schools were Critical Legal Stud-
ies ("CLS"), Law and Economics (Public Choice) and Clinical Legal
Education.
D. CLS, Public Choice and the Challenge of "Post-modern" Law
The randomness and incoherence of law as an open system, touched
on by the Realists, has been reassessed by CLS theorists. Hart and Sachs
thought the randomness and incoherence of the modern legal system
28. It is circular and recursive; a model of "cybernetic interactionism." See Clune,
supra note 15, at 78.
29. For more detail, see McDougall, Social Movements, supra note 9, at 91-92.
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could be tamed or confined by rules, and the rules, rather than the
processes, became the focus of their study.30
The CLS movement pointed out the flaws in a model which ignored
the political dimension: the fashion in which legal decisionmakers in all
three branches went about their business, and the general freedom from
public accountability that each enjoyed. They further charged that all
institutional structures served to create false distinctions between the in-
dividual and the collective, classifying the former as "subjective" and the
latter "objective." These false distinctions were being used to manipu-
late, confuse and take advantage of the public rather than build commu-
nity among them. When pressed for a plan to alter social life, however,
CLS nearly self-destructed in nihilism, proving too intellectually rarified
for the task of praxis.31 CLS has most recently sought refuge in support
for women's and minority perspectives, and has yet to face the task of
developing a praxis rooted in the reality of the white, privileged, left-
leaning, intellectual male.32
The job of sorting out the institutional character of the three branches
of government that were the primary actors in the Legal Process model,
particularly the legislature and the bureaucracy, was taken up by the
branch of Law and Economics called "Public Choice." The theory is so
named to denote the "public" choices involved in legislation and regula-
tion, as opposed to the "private" choices denoted in the contracts which
feature large in traditional Law and Economics material.33 Public
Choice theorists, unlike most Law and Economics scholars, concentrate
on the public-law operations of legislatures and regulatory bureaucracies,
rather than studying private-law transactions.'
30. For an interesting digression on this issue, see Lipkin, supra note 1, at 834, which
correlates skepticism with Legal Realism and CLS.
31. See McDougall, Social Movements, supra note 9, at 94-95 & no.65-77.
32. In this respect, many CLS theorists have taken a position not unlike that taken by
white liberals of the 1960s and 1970s when confronted with the black nationalism of the
period. Cf Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 Duke L.J. 758, 840-844 (discussing how
white liberals and progressives rejected race consciousness as a way to avoid issues of
white cultural identity that black nationalism brought to the fore). But see Gabel &
Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of
Law, 11 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 369, 370, 372 (1982-83)(principal role of the legal
system is to shape popular consciousness toward accepting political legitimacy of the
status quo, a social order most people find alienating and inhumane).
33. The Critical Legal Studies group has made some important contributions in this
area. Professor Mark Tushnet, for example, has commented on the Court. See. eg, M.
Tushnet, Red, White and Blue (1988)(a critical analysis of constitutional law); Tushnet,
Principles, Politics and Constitutional Law, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 49 (1989)(discussing funda-
mental issues about the nature of constitutional government); Tushnet, Toward a Revi-
sionist History of the Supreme Court, 39 Clev. St. L. Rev. 319 (1988)(discussing the
Supreme Court's role in securing the federal government as an independent source of law
beyond interference from state governments). Professor Gerald Frug has written on the
bureaucracy, see Frug, supra note 14. The field of describing the actions of the legisla-
ture, however, has been dominated by Public Choice theorists.
34. Law and Economics has been dominated by the "Chicago School," which views
the function of government to be no more than to ensure a wealth-maximizing result. See
1991]
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In the Public Choice view, legislation is a dynamic, inconsistent equi-
librium in which law grows out of a series of compromises fueled by
legislators' desires to be re-elected, by the expedient accommodation of
special interests and lobbying by individuals and groups.35 In the Public
Choice view legislators do not respond evenly to all lobbyists. Instead,
they react most positively to well-organized and politically influential
("special interest") groups that pursue focused benefits or protection
which are not sought by the general public.36
In the administrative realm, Public Choice theorists see special inter-
ests exercising even greater power. "Iron triangles" develop between a
regulatory agency, the legislative committee that oversees it, and the spe-
cial interest group representing the industry that the agency is required
to regulate. Through these iron triangles, special interest groups influ-
ence the process of implementation and enforcement of legislation even
more than they affected the original framing of such legislation.37
Because the quest for re-election in the legislative arena, and the iron
triangle in the regulatory arena, together create a contentious process
which is political rather than rational, early Public Choice scholars such
as Judge Posner recommended that judges shun the field. Judges, in
their view, had no business upsetting a political balance achieved by
elected or appointed representatives of the people, and should leave any
resultant problems or distortions to the electorate, who have the power
to retain or expel public officials.3" Early Public Choice theorists dis-
played an unshakable faith in the electorate's willingness and ability to
throw the rascals out-a willingness evidenced in the popularity of the
1980s Republican Party program of deregulation.
In sum, early Public Choice theorists greatly contributed to the now
prevailing view that "democratic government serves the interests of
Comment, Refusals to Cross Stranger Picket Lines and the Wealth Maximization Princi-
ple: An Economic Analysis of the Views of the NLRB and Judge Posner, 41 U. Miami L.
Rev. 533, 542 (1987). Chicago School adherents see these private deals, spurred by indi-
vidual desires to maximize wealth, as the only legitimate means by which social resources
can be allocated. See id. at 542-43. Chicago school adherents mistrust government, and
fear that it will be captured by special interests. Government, or "public" choices, then,
should play as minimal a role as possible in determining economic policy or redistributing
wealth. See id.
35. Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Pro-
cess Era, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 691, 705, 710-17 (1987). For a discussion of "special inter-
ests" and its relation to theories of regulation and deregulation, see infra text
accompanying notes 101-06.
36. See id. at 704-06.
37. DeBow & Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public Choice, 66 Tex. L.
Rev. 993, 999-1000 (1988).
38. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 35, at 707-08. This position has caused some to
view the Law and Economics movement as a revival of Langdellian formalism, and a
right-wing attack on Legal Process. See Brest & Vanderberg, Politics, Feminism, and the
Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 607, 657
(1987). But see M. Tushnet, Red, White and Blue 196 n.17 (1988)(recent development of
a "liberal reformist law-and-economics").
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whichever interest group turns out to be the most powerful"-i.e., "spe-
cial interests"-and that very little can, or should be, done about this
other than to reduce the influence of government 39 Though conceding
that legislators occasionally respond to lobbyists who (for ideological or
even altruistic purposes) seek benefits or protection for the public at
large,4" Public Choice theorists minimize the importance and effect of
this phenomenon.4" With CLS flirting with nihilism or occupying itself
with "support work" for minority and female intellectuals, and with
Public Choice reducing itself to an apology for the status quo or for deep
cuts in the regulatory state, it is left to public interest advocates to give
voice to the diffuse (not special) interests of the general public.42 Advo-
cacy in the public interest was central to Clinical Legal Education in its
early years, and still influences Clinical Legal Education curricula.
E. Clinical Legal Education: Practice in Search of a Theory in the
Post-Modern World
Hart and Sachs never developed a lawyering model. The Clinical
Legal Education movement, though concentrating on lawyering topics,
has focused almost exclusively on adjudication, and has not really paid
sufficient attention to the lawyering process involved in legislation and
regulation. In other words, the Clinical Legal Education movement is
not studying the implementation of law other than through the study of
judicial remedies, giving it a decidedly "Langdellian" cast. Clinical legal
educators have yet to develop a vision of law implementation which takes
into account both the interaction among social and economic forces seek-
ing intervention by all branches of government as well as the consequent
interaction of those forces with government and with one another as they
seek to create policy.4 3 As we shall see, the fragmentary insights of Pol-
icy Science, Legal Process, CLS, and Public Choice can be synthesized in
such a way as to usefully broaden the field of vision of clinical legal theo-
rists and practitioners, and to help them prepare their students for the
task at hand.
The work of noted legal activist and Clinical Legal Education theorist
Anthony Amsterdam provides a useful example. Professor Amsterdam
39. See Kahn, Regulation and Imperfect Democracies, prepared for Regulating the
Future, at 2 (publication forthcoming); McDougall, Social Movements, supra note 9, at
92 & nn.51-54, 93 & nn.55-57.
40. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 35, at 704.
41. See DeBow & Lee, supra note 37, at 1005-12. But see Macey, Promoting Public-
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 223, 240-44 (1986)(the Constitution and the federal courts can serve to
restrain private interest groups).
42. For a discussion of the role of "diffuse" public interest in the law and policymak-
ing process, see infra notes 183-200 and accompanying text.
43. This has been called "implementation" research and theory. See McDougall, So-
cial Movements, supra note 9, at 83. See also Clune, supra note 15, at 50-53 (discussing
implementation research and theory). CLS is also experimenting with clinical legal edu-
cation. See Gabel & Harris, supra note 32, at 370-71.
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has written that traditional, formalist, classroom approaches to teaching
law have been too narrowly focused on skills such as case reading and
interpretation, doctrinal analysis and application, and logical conceptual-
ization and criticism." He has contrasted clinical experiences with for-
malist approaches, pointing out that clinics develop different kinds of
skills in students-skills such as ends-means thinking, hypothesis formu-
lation and testing in information acquisition. Clinics, Amsterdam main-
tains, expose students to decisionmaking in situations where options
involve differing and often uncertain degrees of risk.45
Professor Amsterdam's conception, however, remains "traditional" in
that it does not look beyond litigation." This is not surprising. The rise
of the Clinical Legal Education movement about twenty years ago47 co-
incided with the height of confidence on the part of civil rights organiza-
tions and other public-interest groups in the Supreme Court as a means
of solving social problems. If the Clinical Legal Education movement
were to be initiated today, however, legislation, regulation and negotia-
tion might be the training areas of choice.
The reasons why legislation and regulation are preferable to litigation
as a means of addressing broad social problems are innumerable and,
other than a note that the arguments for federal judicial activism are
hopelessly pegged to the Warren Court era, need not be mentioned
here.4" Unlike traditional classroom teachers for whom the appellate
court opinion is the center of the academic universe,49 the pedagogy of
clinics constantly places clinical teachers in the position of solving real
problems. While the former group continues to resist the importance of
legislation and regulation, this importance has become obvious and im-
perative for the latter.50 How might the practical insights of clinical legal
educators and the theoretical insights of Policy Science, Legal Process,
CLS and Public Choice adherents be synthesized into a praxis for the
post-modem legal system?
In this Article, I will reach toward this praxis, which I call Public
44. See Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st-Century Perspective, 34 J.
Legal Educ. 612, 613 (1984).
45. See id at 614-15.
46. In his article, Professor Amsterdam does not discuss how students develop lawy-
ering skills from experience and what role their teachers have in facilitating that learning
process. Much more work is needed on the theory of "learning how to learn from experi-
ence." That discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this article; I have touched on it
elsewhere. See McDougall, Lawyering, supra note 9, at 372-75.
47. See Calm & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession: The Public Interest in
Public Interest Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1005, 1024-31 (1970).
48. See generally Collins & Skover, The Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87
Mich. L. Rev. 189 (1988)(discussing the past, present, and future of liberal legal
scholarship).
49. See McDougall, supra note 9, at 86-89.
50. Many clinicians were taught in law school by academics who pushed litigation
and appellate practice as the core of law; despite their experiences to the contrary, many
clinicians still have the "litigator's habit."
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Interest Lawyering. In Part II, I will view the law and policy universe
which a public interest lawyer confronts in the 1990s. In Part III, I will
review the lawyering skills needed to practice in this universe.
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY UNIVERSE OF THE 1990S
A workable model of the "post-modem" public policy universe of the
1990s should focus our learning upon lawyering in an open system, con-
centrating on the practical and the political as well as on the theoretical.
It should also take note of all three principal sources of law-the "corpus
juris" of our domestic legal system.5" The model must focus not merely
on rules but on a process of decisionmaking that occurs within, and as a
response to, a larger community process. 2 It must, in short, thoroughly
comprehend the journey, traversed daily, from the abstraction of law
(legal doctrine, regulations, etc.) to the concreteness and particularity of
social life.
Such a model must consider a set of controversies which both illumi-
nate and go to the core of the institutional character of the various
branches of post-modem government. These massive, ongoing contro-
versies, which generate turbulence around each of the principal branches
of government, are as essential for a practitioner to perceive as it is for a
sailor to be aware of the existence of riptides or breakwaters.
These controversies, or turbulences, though latent since the founding
of the nation,53 have emerged forcefully in the "post-modem era." This
era opened with the New Deal's initiation of massive governmental inter-
vention into the economy,' 4 and was expanded by the New Frontier/
Great Society's massive governmental intervention into the social struc-
ture. 5 It is closing with struggles over conservative political dominance,
beginning with the cases growing out of Watergate,5 6 but continuing into
51. See Amsterdam, supra note 44, at 618.
52. McDougal, supra note 16, at 1355.
53. See Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial
Review, 51 Ohio St. LJ. 175, 179-86 (1990); Yassky, A Two-Tiered Theory of Consolida-
tion and Separation of Powers, 99 Yale LJ. 431, 432-33 (1989).
54. See Shapiro, APA: Pas Presen4 Future, 72 Va. L. Rev. 447, 455 (1986). See also
Yassky, supra note 53, at 431 ("Roosevelt's innovations centralized within large bureau-
cracies power that previously had been dispersed among the three governmental
branches. This consolidation of power fits uneasily into the constitutional framework es-
tablished by the Founders"); id. at 433-35 (nondelegation doctrine). See generally
Yassky, supra note 53 (developing and applying a post-New Deal approach to the alloca-
tion of government power).
The New Deal was designed to "pacify the major players in the political game, and to
allow industry clients to earn modest monopoly profits, provided the clients shared those
profits with organized labor and did not unduly burden the public." De Long, New Wine
for a New Bottle. Review in the Regulatory State, 72 Va. L. Rev. 399, 422 (1986).
55. See DeLong, supra note 54, at 422, 436 (social regulatory agencies such as the
Occupational Safety and Health Agency and the Environmental Protection Agency have
no stopping point; when has there been "enough" regulation?).
56. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen'l Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977)(Presidential
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, which directed the Administrator of General
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issues regarding Congressional control over executive agencies57 and
their budgets,58 the independence of special prosecutors, 9 individual
rights both to privacy' and to affirmative relief for discrimination 61 and
the relative authority of Congress and the President to make war.
62 Of
special importance in comprehending this era is an understanding of the
role of the media, the President, Congress, the bureaucracy and the fed-
eral courts,'especially the Supreme Court.
A. The Role of the Media in Public Policy: Agenda-Setting
No discussion of public policymaking and the fate of the public inter-
est would be complete without a comment on the role of the media.
While the news media is sometimes portrayed as an objective "mirror" of
the events which form the cultural, political, and economic parameters of
our society, each media organization is first and foremost a business.63
As such, it is responsive to specific external pressures, more generalized
social and political "norms," and the professional culture and political
Services to seize President Nixon's records, did not unconstitutionally invade his right to
privacy); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)(the contribution, disclosure and record-
keeping provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act are constitutional); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)(discussing the extent of the President's immunity
from the judicial process). See Entin, supra note 53, at 175-79 (especially 175-76), 186-
190 (discussing the renewed attention given to separation of powers disputes by the
Supreme Court in the aftermath of Watergate).
57. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-58 (1983). See also Entin, supra note 53, at
190-95 (discussing the legislative veto and the holdings of Chadha).
58. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986). See also Entin, supra note 53,
at 196-200 (discussing Bowsher and other cases defining executive powers and the re-
moval procedure); Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process (Book Review), 77
Calif. L. Rev. 919, 926 (1989)(reviewing W. Eskridge & P. Frickey, Cases and Materials
on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy (1988)); Levinson, Balancing
Acts: Bowsher v. Synar, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, and Beyond, 72 Cornell L Rev. 527,
530-39 (1989)(discussing the Bowsher Court's characterization of the Comptroller Gen-
eral's function as "Executive"); Note, Beyond Bowsher: A Separation of Powers Approach
to the Delegation of Budgetary Authority, 55 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1405, 1410-13 (1990)(dis-
cussing majority, concurring and dissenting opinions in Bowsher).
Another way to look at this is to say that Congress can remove an officer with execu-
tive responsibility only through the process of impeachment. See Entin, supra note 53, at
187 n.86. Still another "take" is that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings violated bicameralism
and presentment. See Note, supra, at 1414, which discusses Stevens' concurrence.
59. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 661-62 (1988); Entin, supra note 53, at 201-
06.
60. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(acknowledging a woman's right
to an abortion, which may, however, be outweighed by the state's compelling interest in
the health of the mother and/or fetus). But cf. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
492 U.S. 490 (1989)(upholding Missouri statute regulating the performance of abortions).
61. See Croson v. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. 469, 493-508 (1989); Civil Rights Act
of 1990, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. S1019-25 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990).
62. See Ange v. U.S., 752 F. Supp 509, 514-15 (D.D.C. 1990). See also Dellums v.
Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1144-45 (D.D.C. 1990)(discussing the President's and Con-
gress' constitutionally vested power to declare war).
63. Television, especially, exhibits very strong entertainment and commercial biases.
See Collins & Skover, supra note 48, at 1087; D. Kellner, Television and the Crisis of
Democracy 111 (1990).
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orientation of its members. 64
Each media organization, as a going concern, must respond to external
pressures from advertisers,65 organizational affiliates," news sources and
interest groups.' Source pressure is one of the most important. Large
corporations and government agencies can bring a great deal of pressure
to bear on media organizations through press releases (which are a sur-
prisingly effective way to "lobby" news media), news conferences, "back-
grounder" conferences, and leaks.6 Government officials have at times
attempted to manage and even directly intimidate the media. Certainly,
all large public and private bureaucracies hire public relations firms to
handle their relations with the media.
Each media organization also operates under the "internal" pressures
of interpersonal relations and professional norms,69 production
processes,70 cost-benefit analysis, and profit71 and legal constraints.
Deadlines and the quest for "soundbites," for example, affect the shape
and contour of newsreporting. Groups of reporters covering the same
event can result in "pack" journalism, in which all agree on a certain
variation of a news story or even designate one or two to write it for all of
them.7
3
Even more important, however, are the tendencies of the media to
present news in dramatic and personalized form, focusing on individuals
and their personalities (including the personalities of newscasters as well
as those of news "makers") rather than on political, economic and pro-
cess factors.74 Thus, absent a background in public affairs, it is very diffi-
cult for the "consumer" of news to discern how the economic and
political system actually works. This focus on dramatis personae encour-
ages the untutored consumer to view events as carried on by super-per-
sonalities and reinforces his or her own feelings of powerlessness and
disengagement.75
It is for this reason that the President, rather than members of Con-
gress or the Supreme Court, is likely to be a candidate for a news story.
The President is easy to present as a dramatic figure, and is likely to
collaborate with the media in this respect. Truly controversial events
occurring in less dramatic settings-the Supreme Court, federal agencies,
64. See D. Graber, Mass Media and American Politics 82-83 (1989).
65. See R. Berkman & L. Kitch, Politics in the Media Age 90-93 (1986).
66. See id. at 93-94.
67. See hi. at 87-90, 94-95.
68. See id. at 87-89; D. Nimmo & K. Saunders, Handbook of Political Communica-
tion 449-52 (1981).
69. See D. Graber, supra note 64, at 47-52.
70. See R. Berkman & L. Kitch, supra note 65, at 79-82, 84-86.
71. See id. at 78-79
72. See generally D. Graber, supra note 64, at 89-113 (discussing legal restraints on
rights of access and of free publication).
73. See R. Berkman & L. Kitch, supra note 65, at 82-84.
74. See L. Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion 82-84 (1988).
75. See id. at 27.
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or Congressional committees-may well be overlooked, reducing the in-
formation flow to the public.76
Further, longstanding policy problems, such as excessive defense
spending, the problems of savings and loan institutions, poverty, and the
lack of adequate health care and housing, are likely to become news-
worthy only when they reach crisis proportions. This further reinforces
the sense of powerlessness in the consumer, who is increasingly left out of
the decisiomaking process."
Finally, "normalization" of the media presents events and personali-
ties in a favorable light only when they conform to media personnel's
perception of what the consumer will "buy." ' Official versions of events
are sought out, and the views of "deviants" such as strikers, demonstra-
tors, and members of minor political parties are undercut, minimalized,
or discredited.79 As a result, the range of models for acceptable political
behavior is narrowed considerably, and we see more and more "con-
servative" political candidates emerging and winning. 0 This has been
particularly true in Presidential elections.
C. The Presidency
Public Choice theorist Martin Shapiro argues that an increased con-
centration of power in the office of the President (the so-called "impe-
rial" Presidency) is an aberration which has been brought about by
casting our Chief Executive more and more in the role of the head of a
parliamentary government, with the extraordinary power there entailed,
without the restraint of party discipline.8"
Though FDR was the first "imperial" President, it has been the Re-
publican party, through skillful manipulation of the national electoral
process, that has monopolized the office.82 This has become more salient
as campaign finance reform has moved the nominating process away
from party functions (the Democrats had the larger, stronger party) to
an open-media event, in which dollars count for more than bodies and
the "normalization" tendencies of the media have worked to the advan-
tage of conservative candidates.8 3
76. See id. at 35-36.
77. See id. at 46-49.
78. See L. Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion 51-52, 60-62 (1988).
79. See id at 52.
80. See id at 60.
81. See Shapiro, supra note 54, at 449-52. Parliamentary democracies, such as Eng-
land, place the control of the executive branch of government in the hands of the party
that is elected to a majority of the seats in the legislative branch. Executive power in such
systems is greater than that afforded the executive in our non-parliamentary democracy,
but it is held in check by the power of the majority party to form a new government. See
id.
82. See generally Rauh, An Unabashed Liberal Looks at a Hal/-Century of the
Supreme Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 213, 213-20, 247-49 (1991)(article suggests a struggle of
paradigms between liberals and conservatives).
83. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), is the Supreme Court's critique of Congress'
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The imperiousness of the office is illustrated internationally through
the President's increased power to commit troops abroad in hostile situa-
tions free of restraint by Congress. More recently, this issue has been
reflected in the Persian Gulf crisis,"' but it has been seen, during the
terms of both Democratic and Republican Presidents, in the Cuban Mis-
sile crisis, the Vietnam War, the invasions of Grenada and Panama, the
mining of NicaragUan harbors, and the Iran-Contra scandal. Domesti-
cally, the imperiousness of the Presidency is expressed in terms of the
Chief Executive's control over the bureaucracy,'- but, as in the Water-
gate scandal, the President's power has been extended even into the lives
of private citizens.
The most important efforts to restrain the "imperial" President arose
from the uproar surrounding Watergate and the Vietnam conflict, both
legacies of the Nixon Presidency. The principal remaining piece of legal
structure on the international front remaining from the Vietnam War era
is the War Powers Resolution.86 The War Powers Resolution has been a
controversial, and often ineffective, means of keeping the President in
check.87 In the most recent court test of the President's warmaking
power, for example, it was not even mentioned. Rep. Ron Deluins and
thirty-odd other members of Congress, suing in the District Court for the
District of Columbia, argued only that President Bush could not commit
attempt at campaign finance reform in Presidential elections, and gives us some sense of
the Court's likely response to current attempts to reform Congressional campaign fi-
nance. The Buckley court considered the constitutionality of key provisions of the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act of 1971 and related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,
all as amended in 1974, which attempted to regulate contributions and expenditures in
Presidential campaigns, as well as set up a system of public financing for Presidential
primaries and national elections.
Because money is required for access to the media, the Court reasoned that a restric-
tion on the amount of money a candidate could spend in a campaign would abridge free
speech, essentially by reducing its volume and amplitude. See id. at 18-19. See generally
Comment, Protecting the Rationality of Electoral Outcome" A Challenge to First Amend-
ment Doctrine, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 892, 917-24 (1984)(discussing the Supreme Court's
failure to promote electoral rationality in Buckley and its progeny).
Of course, "a system of allocating offices on the basis of ability to pay is irrational;
there is no relationship between wealth and the ability to lead the nation or promote its
welfare." Id at 928. The upshot of the Buckley decision, however, may be to the con-
trary: you can't buy a candidate, but you can buy an election.
84. Compare H.R.J. Res. 658, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. H8312 (daily ed.
Sept. 27, 1990)(resolution introduced by Rep. Fascell supporting Bush's action with re-
spect to Iraqi aggression against Kuwait) with H.R. Con. Res. 372, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
236 Cong. Rec. H7890 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1990)(resolution introduced by Rep. Bennet
limiting support to that taken in accordance with United Nations Security Council direc-
tives and mandating Congressional approval of military offiensive action). See also S.
Con. Res. 147, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. S14206 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1990)(in-
troduced by Sen. Michell and identical to H.R.J. Res. 658).
85. See Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 670-77 (1988).
86. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c)(1991).
87. See Richardson, Checks and Balances in Foreign Relations, 83 AJ.I.L 736, 738-
39 (1989). See also P. Holt, The War Powers Resolution: The Role of Congress in U.S.




troops to offensive hostilities in the Persian Gulf without prior Congres-
sional authorization. 8 Their suit was mooted when Congress voted to
support the President's decision.
The principal item of legal structure on the domestic front remaining
from the period, the Independent Prosecutor statute, grows out of the
experiences with Watergate.89 This statute might well see service in in-
vestigations into Iran/Contra and the Savings & Loan crisis.' °
D. Congress
In Congress, the lack of party discipline is a key problem. The leader-
ship of Congress has decentralized from committee chairs to subcommit-
tee chairs and, finally, to a state of affairs in which virtually any Member
can grab a headline and affect the agenda for public policy.91
One of the reasons party discipline is so lax is that the parties no
longer play the primary role in selecting candidates and supporting their
campaigns. The candidates are selected through primaries, and a pri-
mary, unlike the old party caucus technique of selecting candidates, ig a
media event. Because media advertising is a matter of money rather than
building party discipline, "Old Property" holders and Political Action
Committees ("PACs") exercise more influence than the parties do.
The traditional justification for deference to the will of the legislature
is that the elected legislature represents the majority. CLS theorists ar-
gue, however, that the vast majority of the electorate is utterly passive
and any preferences they express are so hedged by inequality and igno-
rance as to be almost meaningless.92 The electorate is powerless and
"T.V.-addled," 93 bombarded with information which is scattered and pa-
rochially focused, albeit highly financed. This type of information may
not play the informational role for which "free speech" protections were
designed. Such information may be not as important, in the post-modem
era, as information which is channelled through parties and other groups
that reinforce the rationality of the decisionmaking process.9 4 Because
the re-emergence of party discipline and a stronger role for parties vis-a-
vis the media in selecting and promoting candidates seems unlikely, it
88. See Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1143-44 (D.D.C. 1990).
89. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99.
90. See generally Morrison, 487 U.S. at 712-13, 732-33 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing)(observing that independent counsel could be selected to prosecute any federal official
for engaging in conduct that Congress disapproved).
91. For an extended discussion of the erosion of party influence in both the electoral
and governance processes, see McDougall, The New Property vs the New Community, 24
U.S.F. L. Rev. 399, 404-07 (1990) [hereinafter The New Property]. Contra G. Jones & J.
Marini, The Imperial Congress 195-96 (1988)(a congressman who votes contrary to his
party's policy may preclude himself from obtaining a seat on a preferred committee).
92. The Critical Scholar's view is summarized in Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 35,
at 326-30.
93. McDougall, Social Movements, supra note 9, at 95 & n.70.
94. See Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence
in Political Institutions, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 917, 918-25 (1990).
[Vol. 60
PUBLIC INTEREST
will be up to public interest organizations and social movements to fill in
the gaps.9
5
Another reason for the erosion of policy discipline is the parties' abdi-
cation of their role in setting and implementing the agenda for public
policy. The media has virtually monopolized the field of agenda-set-
ting.96 Lobbyists and staff collaborate on the implementation of the
agenda. Thus, the party is left with very little control.
According to Norbert Reich, the legislature generally responds to
"special interests ...put forward by social actors who are well or-
gani[z]ed because they may win (or lose) a great deal by social change.""
The Public Choice view on Congress is that each incumbent is in a mo-
nopoly position with respect to political influence, and charges the going
rate. Add to this the Public Choice view that legislators respond more to
constituents who have much to lose than to those who have much to
gain,98 and you have a partial explanation for the policy paralysis and
spiralling budget deficits in which we find our government.
It is plausible that powerful special interests will not allow government
to affect their affairs without influencing the government in return. At-
tempts to control this process may only encourage special interests to
operate in a more creative and covert fashion.9 With the imposition of
sanctions, however, these groups' conduct can be deterred or at least
brought before the public."c
95. See McDougall, Social Movements, supra note 9, at 94-96.
Social movements face the challenge of manipulating voter preference, which is often
achieved by creating strongly compelling counter-images in order to prevail in the policy
arena. Humans respond to compelling, graphic stories. Broadbased statistical studies
which counter such stories typically fail to receive comparable attention. The impact of
the Willie Horton story, compared with the impact of statistical data on the uneventful
nature of most prison furloughs, demonstrates the premise. See Margulies, "Who Are
You to Tell Me That?'" Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Non-Legal Issues and the
Interests of Non-Clients, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 213, 219-20 n.23 (1989).
96. See K. Lawson & P. Merkl, When Parties Fail 170 (1988).
97. N. Reich, supra note 1, at xxv-xxvi.
98. Judge Posner's position on the operations of Congress is summarized in W. Es-
kridge & P. Frickey, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of
Public Policy 324-26 (1988).
99. See Comment, The Wisconsin Partial Veto: Past; Present and Future, 1989 Wis. L
Rev. 1395, 1409-15 (1989).
100. According to a 1978 Common Cause study, needed reforms include disclosure of:
(a) identities of organization's major lobbyists;
(b) major issues on which organization lobbies;
(c) estimated total amount of money organization spend on lobbying;
(d) amount of money spent on major grassroots lobbying campaigns; and
(e) the identities of organizations which are major contributors to the lob-
bying organizations.
See Cohen & Wolff, Freeing Congress from the Special Interest State: A Public Interest




1. Regulating the Old Property or Deregulating the New: Which
Way for the Public Interest?
Given the directions in which both the Presidency and the Congress
have evolved in the post-modem era, there are important limits, in prac-
tical terms, of both New Deal-style government regulation (compatible
with a "Legal Process" theory) and Reagan-style deregulation (compati-
ble with a "Public Choice" theory). Some private property owners (per-
haps factory owners, large landowners or owners of commercial
businesses) see their economic well-being as vindicated by an unregulated
market. They seek to escape from, rather than to benefit from, govern-
ment assistance and/or regulation.' 0 ' Let us refer, collectively, to such
private property owners as holders of "Old Property."
Under New Deal and Legal Process conceptions of the law, the legisla-
ture and bureaucracy are called into service to regulate the activities of
such holders of Old Property. Charles Reich considered those who bene-
fit from the resulting system of government regulation of the economy to
be holders of a different, "New Property."'" These are the beneficiaries
of government subsidies, licenses, and regulations of all kinds.
Ironically, Old and New Property holders can turn out to be the same
people. Public Choice theory provides a useful explanation of how and
why this can happen. Legislators are very interested in being re-elected,
and sometimes use their power under a New Property regulatory system
to benefit, rather than restrict, holders of Old Property, who are often
well-heeled and can finance campaigns. Bureaucrats, whose responsibil-
ity it is to execute the New Property program of government regulation
and subsidy, must respond to the legislators, who manage bureaucratic
agency budgets as well as their scope of authority-and consequently
their power. Bureaucrats are also occasionally interested in directly cur-
rying favor with Old Property interests that may afford them lucrative
corporate positions upon leaving the "revolving door" of government
service. Thus, as discussed above, iron triangles are formed between Old
Property holders, the bureaucrats who are assigned to regulate them
under a New Property system and the legislators who are assigned to
oversee the bureaucrats.10 3 Iron triangles are likely to develop in part
because of the lack of party discipline. The dependence of candidates on
(i) Old Property holders and PACs for campaign funds, (ii) media for
agenda-setting and communication with the voters, and (iii) lobbyists for
coordination and implementation of policy likewise provides a fertile me-
dium for iron triangles.
Thus, the holders of the Old Property have found a way to influence
and manage the exercise of government regulation and subsidy intro-
101. See C. Reich, supra note 3, at 771-73.
102. See iL at 785-87.
103. See G. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 46-51 (1982).
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duced into our system by the New Property. As the interests of the hold-
ers of the Old Property penetrate the New Property regime, we call them
"special interests."" 4 In this corruption of the Legal Process/regulatory
ideal, accurately described by Public Choice theorists, regulations wind
up strengthening Old Property interests with New Property privileges
they could not have achieved in the private sector.
Transportation magnates, for example, have been treated to barriers
that restrict the entry of newcomers into their economic field, creating
publicly-supported cartels. 1°5 Banks have been treated to a "free ride"
on taxpayer-insured deposits. Developers have been allowed to play fast
and loose with government money designed to house the poor. Thus, the
regulatory system rationalized by Legal Process winds up serving "spe-
cial interests" rather than the "public interest." This creates iron trian-
gles among a special interest, the regulatory agency charged with
supervising it and the congressional subcommittee charged with super-
vising the regulatory agency."°6
Iron triangles are certainly not for the protection of the public-the
scattered, diffuse and unconnected individuals who were to be the benefi-
ciaries of New Property rights such as clean air and water, pure food,
and antidiscrimination. Norbert Reich refers to these generalized needs
for improvements in and protection of quality of life (not held exclusively
by any special interest group or focused on parochial economic advance-
ment) as the "diffuse interests" of the public.107
Public Choice theorists, so clearly aligned with the ideology of Reagan
republicanism, advocated massive deregulation as a means of putting an
end to the corruption of government with which they associate the New
Property. But the deregulatory ideal has begun to sputter as it becomes
clear that Old Property "special interests" are at least as adept at getting
their way under deregulation as under regulation-perhaps more so.
The savings and loan ("S&L") crisis is the clearest example.'
a. The S&L Crisis Part I- The Failure of "New Property" Regulation
The S&L crisis has a price tag exceeding $500 billion," 9 three times
the cost of the Vietnam War. The Depression decimated the banking
industry in the 1930s, shaking the Old Property's grip on our financial
system. Many banks closed and the unfavorable economic conditions of
the times prevented and discouraged the opening of new lending institu-
104. See id.
105. See Kahn, supra note 39, at 307 n.104.
106. See McDougaU, Social Movements, supra note 9, at 95 & nn.75-76. See also Mc-
Dougall, New Property, supra note 91, at 399-400 (generally discussing problems created
by or associated with New Property).
107. N. Reich, supra note 1, at xxv-xxvii.
108. The following discussion is based on Bearak & Furlong, Totting Up the Blame for
the S&L Crisis, L.A. Times, Sept. 16, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
109. See Quint, New Estimate on Savings Bailout Says Cost Could Be S500 Billion,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1990, at A1, col. 1.
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tions. Consequently, the country lost its historical source of funding for
mortgage loans; the construction industry collapsed; and many individu-
als, unable to refinance their existing mortgages, lost their homes. 110 The
S&L system created by the New Deal Congress was a species of the New
Property, based on government subsidy and regulation rather than on the
laissez faire system.
As part of an overall response to the collapse of the financial system,
Congress in the 1930s assigned to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
the responsibility of both promoting and regulating S&Ls so that public
concerns about the stability of the financial system could be mitigated.
Congress also provided for citizen deposits in the S&Ls to be insured by
the federal government for up to $40,000.11 The taxpayers would back
individual deposits against S&L failures. Finally, Congress limited the
rate of return banks could earn for money lent and the amount of interest
the S&Ls could pay out to depositors, and it restricted S&L lending ex-
clusively to long-term mortgages for the purchase of private homes."1 2
The overall objective was to encourage savings, contribute to the viability
of the economy, and ensure that funds would be available for the com-
mon citizen to purchase his own home at a reasonable price.' 13
As long as the S&L industry enjoyed substantial government protec-
tion and operated in a relatively stable environment, the rules of the
game thus established seemed to work. The public had a source for pri-
vate home ownership and a safe harbor for its nest eggs. The S&Ls were
confined to long-term home loans, and as long as interest rates remained
stable, their income would exceed their liabilities to depositors.
However, the rules of the game changed with the onset of the Vietnam
War. Interest rate increases affected the ability of S&Ls to compete with
other financial institutions; the S&Ls were forced to pay greater interest
on their deposits than they were receiving on their home loans. 4 To-
ward the end of the 1970s, interest rates approached 20%. Banks and
other financial institutions offered relatively high rates of return, but the
S&Ls were still restricted in this respect." 5 Depositors began withdraw-
ing their funds from the S&Ls and placing them with institutions which
offered a greater return." I 6 By the end of the Carter Administration, the
economy had buckled and inflation sent interest rates sky high. Money
110. See Note, Too Many Consonants and Not Enough Consonance: The Development
of the S&L Regulatory Framework, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regu-
lation, the S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S263, S267
(1991).
111. See generally id. (describing the origin of the deposit insurance system).
112. See Note, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, in Annual Survey of Financial
Institutions and Regulation, the S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L.
Rev. 5301, S302 (1991).
113. See id. at S303 n.16.
114. See id. at S303-04.




was rapidly being drained from S&Ls.1 17 The economic underpinnings
for this piece of the New Property were disappearing. Deregulation was
by then coming into vogue, and it was to that policy that policymakers
began to turn for an answer to the S&L problem.I"
b. The S&L Crisis Part Il Deregulation and the Re-Emergence
of the Old Property
Congress in 1980 reacted to the growing S&L crisis by adjusting the
rules of the game in a contradictory fashion. The first adjustment was to
raise the limit on insured deposits by raising the insured ceiling from
$40,000 to $100,000.9 This expanded New Property protection for de-
positors. Next, however, Congress passed the Gain-St Germain Act of
1982,1 which freed S&Ls from dealing exclusively in long-term mort-
gages on family homes and took the banks one large step toward deregu-
lation, returning to the Old Property, laissez faire approach. The
investment world was opened up to all manner and form of real estate
investment.
However, Congress failed to take into account the S&Ls' inexperience
in operating in these new, uncharted waters. The Garn-St Germain Act
allowed the S&Ls to keep less money on reserve for unanticipated crises,
allowed questionable accounting systems to be implemented, lowered the
capital requirements of the industry, and basically discouraged oversight
of the S&Ls.12'
In addition, the Bank Board itself abandoned policies that were in-
tended to reduce risk to the taxpayer in favor of greater investment flexi-
bility in the free market, policies which it thought would revitalize the
S&L industry. The remaining regulation still required by the Board was
ineffectual because of the Board's lack of resources and staff.
The rules in many states were also adjusted to better fit the economic
policy of the current administration. Because of the expanded range of
permissible investments for both federally- and state-chartered thrift in-
stitutions under the deregulatory regime," the S&L industry was ripe
for exploitation by cash-desperate entrepreneurs, as well as by certain
criminal elements. The low capital requirements instituted by the Garn-
St Germain Act enabled such individuals to acquire an institution by
investing little or no capital. For these investors there was almost noth-
ing to lose if their investments did not prove successful.
117. See id.
118. See id. at S305-08.
119. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified at various sections of 12 U.S.C.).
120. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982)(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811).
121. See Note, supra note 112, at S314-16.
122. See Felsenfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis, in Annual Survey of Financial Insti-




Recall, however, that New Property protection had not only been re-
tained, but was also expanded for depositors. Thus, banks could gamble
in "Old Property" fashion with "New Property"-government- (i.e., tax-
payer- ) backed savings deposits. They went on a spree and took the
taxpayers along for the ride. Pursuant to Garn-St Germain, the Bank
Board's "hands-off" posture and other "deregulatory" statutes and poli-
cies of both state and federal government, the S&Ls ecame free-wheel-
ing gamblers with taxpayer-backed, insured deposits as their "stake."
c. The S&L Crisis Part 111" The Special Interests
vs. the Public Interest
The S&L industry, during the 1980s, contributed millions to the cam-
paigns of many in Congress. Many of the entrepreneurs that purchased
failing S&Ls also had important contacts in the Capitol. When Federal
Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") Chairman Edwin Grey began
cracking down on the industry, S&L owners called in their chits with
various members of Congress to pressure and even intimidate the
regulators.
By the time the health of the nation's thrifts came to the attention of
the general public, much of the net worth of the thrifts had already been
lost. Some thrifts in Texas had engaged in so many corrupt practices
that it took a month to prepare the referrals for criminal prosecution.
Assets lost through fraud or poor investment, however, only account for
a portion of the losses to taxpayers. The administrative and interest costs
in themselves will be the biggest drain on state and federal funds. What
went wrong? What happened to the New Property as a paradigm for
organizing social life with respect to homeownership and the mainte-
nance of sound savings and loan institutions?
From the beginning, lawmakers had a personal interest in the S&L
legislation. First, by creating safe havens for individuals' nest eggs and
providing funds for home ownership, those in Congress helped support
the "American Dream" and thus insured their own re-election. Second,
Congress and the S&L industry it created embarked on a long courtship.
Over twenty two million dollars from the thrift industry found its way to
congressional campaigns in the 1980s, giving the S&Ls a strong hand in
setting Congress' agenda in the field.
With the help of Congressional oversight, the industry "captured" the
regulators as well. Bank Board employees were poorly paid and over-
worked. Those Bank Board employees who "worked well" with S&L
institutions often found better paying jobs waiting in the private sector.
At the same time, industry people were often appointed to top level gov-
ernment positions. This "revolving door" was the crowning feature of
agency capture. As a result, regulators have favored the S&L industry to
the detriment of the diffuse public interest in financial security that they
[Vol. 60
PUBLIC INTEREST
were supposed to protect. 123
2. Control of the Bureaucracy' 2 4
The S&L crisis is a prime illustration of the need to control the bureau-
cracy in the public interest. It is also a prime illustration of the failure of
Congress to perform that role. How, then, is bureaucracy to be con-
trolled? What degree of autonomy does and should the bureaucracy en-
joy from either Congress or the President?"z
The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 126 a creature of the New
Deal/Legal Process era, was presented as a means of maintaining control
over the bureaucracy through requiring rational, public processes subject
to judicial review.127 Key provisions of the APA involved the scope of
judicial review of agency action and the distinction between adjudication
and rulemaking. The compromise contained in the APA provided that
agency adjudication would be subject to judicial review; that rulemaking
would be relatively immune from judicial review; and that all other deci-
sions would be committed to agency discretion. 128
With respect to the latter, some concern was expressed about the ex-
cessive adherence to procedural formalities required in the adjudication
process. Too much adherence to procedure was thought to limit the bu-
reaucracy's ability to handle policy disputes. Administrative law was not
to be "judicialized;" rather, the agencies should have the freedom to ar-
rive at correct, public-interest-oriented decisions. 129
Questions regarding rulemaking did not arise at first, as agencies did
not engage in extensive rulemaking until the 1960s. At that point, a con-
cern was raised by conservatives that agencies engaging in extensive
rulemaking had come to wield too much concentrated power. In parlia-
mentary government systems, the executive wields great power, but par-
liament controls the executive. Professor Shapiro argues that the APA
was the tool of New Dealers who sought to create the executive half of
that system to the exclusion of the parliamentary half.'13 Courts were to
defer to the legislature, the legislature was to defer to the agencies, and
the agencies were to follow the directives of the President (at the time,
Franklin D. Roosevelt).
But liberals have lost control of the Presidency and have become less
123. See Note, A Note to Congress and the FDIC- After FIRREA, Where's the BIF7, in
Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, the S&L Crisis: Death and
Transfiguration, 59 Fordhan L. Rev. S459, 5497 n.307 (1991).
124. Compare Shapiro, supra note 54 (Public Choice view of the bureaucracy) with
Frug, supra note 14 (CLS view of the bureaucracy).
125. See Shapiro, supra note 54, at 486-87.
126. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)(dispersed throughout Title 5 U.S.C.).
127. See Geilhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 Va. L Rev.
219, 227 (1986).
128. See id. at 227-32.
129. See id at 232.
130. See Shapiro, supra note 54, at 450-51.
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sure of their control over the legislature. As a result, says Shapiro, they
retreated to a view of relative agency autonomy, backed by judicial re-
view. Unfortunately, liberal loss of the Presidency has led to liberal
losses in the courts, particularly the Supreme Court.
F. The Judiciary
Are courts the proper guardians of the public interest? According to
Norbert Reich, the answer is no. In his view, courts are reluctant to
enforce the rights of the diffuse interests of the public. Courts see the
interests of holders of Old Property or "special-interest" New Property
as well-defined entitlements. In contrast, judges are apt to view the dif-
fuse public interests in, say, environmental quality as amorphous and
lacking the precision of subjective claims made by clearly-identified
interests.1 31
Moreover, the federal courts in general, and the Supreme Court in par-
ticular, are being stripped of any tendency to protect the diffuse interests
of the public in pure food and drugs, a clean environment, and the civil
rights of minorities. This process has been carried on by a succession of
conservative Presidents who have appointed Justices to the Court who
espouse certain political views.132
Liberal President Franklin D. Roosevelt was a strong advocate of
"transformative appointments" to the Supreme Court.' 33 Roosevelt was
faced with a conservative Supreme Court which had since 1905 consist-
ently struck down state economic regulation contending that the state
legislature had usurped its proper authority.'34 In the 1930s, the Court
took on Roosevelt's New Deal, striking down New Deal legislation on
similar grounds. These decisions spurred Roosevelt to "transform" the
conservative, activist Court. Soon Roosevelt nominees comprised a ma-
jority of the Court, and they affirmed all New Deal legislation.' 35 During
the Warren and early Burger Court eras, the Court was atypically to the
left of Congress, and particularly to the left of most state legislatures, not
only in terms of economic policy but in terms of civil rights and civil
liberties as well.1 36 As a consequence, liberals focused more and more of
their attention on the Court.
131. See N. Reich, supra note 1, at xxx. These differences in judicial approach to spe-
cial interests and diffuse public interests are generally subsumed under the rubric of
"standing."
132. See Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1164, 1179-84
(1988).
133. See L. Baker, Back to Back: The Duel Between FDR and the Supreme Court 9
(1967).
134. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).
135. See generally C.H. Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court (1948)(discussing changes
made by Roosevelt appointees in the New Deal era in fields such as criminal law, labor
and economic regulation).
136. See generally Nichol, An Activism of Ambivalence (Book Review), 98 Harv. L.




After a generation of liberal domination of the Supreme Court, how-
ever, the first signs of reversal began to appear. It took another genera-
tion for the process to be completed. First, in 1960, liberal Justice Fortas
lost his battle to be confirmed by the Senate as Chief Justice. Then, in
1968, Richard Nixon made opposition to the Warren Court part of his
presidential campaign.
President Nixon nominated three Justices who would curb the judicial
activism that yielded social change, and who would not expand the deci-
sions issued by the Warren Court.13 His first nominee, Judge Clement
Haynsworth, Jr., was rejected by the Senate on political and ideological
grounds. The second, Judge G. Harold Carswell, was rejected on similar
grounds, added to concern regarding his ethics and professional qualifi-
cations,13 his symbolism for Nixon's "Southern Strategy," his lack of
professional distinction and his questionable civil rights record. 39 Judge
Harry Blackmun, Nixon's third nominee, was accepted. His "compe-
tence, temperament, and non-judicial record" were promptly reviewed
and accepted. 40
When Nixon nominated Blackmun, he appeared to be a conservative
judge. Blackmun has since become "a pragmatic, strongly independent
jurist who more often than not votes with the Court's two more liberal
Justices." 4 ' Thus, President Nixon only achieved partial success. His
transformative effort created a politically conservative Court in the realm
of criminal procedure, education and social welfare. However, on issues
of discrimination, alienage, legitimacy and abortion rights, the Court re-
mained liberal and activist.
When President Reagan came to office in 1980, he fostered the con-
servative judicial movement begun in the 1970s. 42 President Reagan's
chance to realign the Supreme Court came when Justice Stewart retired
in October 1980. Sandra Day O'Connor, Reagan's first appointment,
was a critical fifth vote for the conservative bloc, but she was cautious
and change came slowly.' 43
In 1986, when Lewis F. Powell, Jr. retired, President Reagan's chance
arose to imprint the Supreme Court by creating a bloc of four indisputa-
ble conservative votes. 1" Though Robert Bork was rejected, the Senate,
exhausted from the Bork fight, confirmed Anthony Kennedy based on
137. McConnell, Haynsworth and Carswelk A New Senate Standard of Excellence, 59
Ky. L. 7, 21 (1970).
138. See id.
139. See id at 21-23.
140. See id at 25.
141. Friedman, Tribal Myths" Ideology and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nomi-
nations (Book Review), 95 Yale L.J. 1283, 1314 n.186 (1986)(quoting Jenkins, A Candid
Talk With Justice Blackmun, N.Y. Times Magazine, Feb. 20, 1983, at 22).
142. See E. Witt, A Different Justice 1 (1986).
143. See id at 10.




his temperament, professional qualifications and integrity even though
some senators had grave reservations.145 Justice Kennedy has been an
influential fifth vote, creating a conservative bloc and a Reagan legacy of
conservative Justices who may serve for a generation. 14 6
President Bush, following in the footsteps of Nixon and Reagan, had
his chance to further the Supreme Court's conservative transformation
when Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. retired. While Justice Brennan had
spent his thirty-four years on the bench "reinforcing individual rights
against government power,"" President Bush's nominee, Judge David
H. Souter, is expected to complete the transformative process described
above.14 It is also important to remember that the lower federal
courts-the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, but also many
others-have been shifted as significantly to the right by Reagan-Bush
transformative appointments as has the Supreme Court itself.
Today, the conservative majority advocates judicial restraint and def-
erence to the intent of the framers, to the Constitution and to Congress.
Eventually, however, the Court may engage in conservative activism to
impose limitations on the power of Congress to engage in liberal poli-
cymaking. The political labels of judicial activism and judicial restraint
may well reverse themselves, not only with respect to civil rights, but also
with respect to the New Deal-positive government that overcame separa-
tion of powers to create economic rights. 149
G. Separation and Coordination of the Branches of Government
Liberals view the Bill of Rights as the principal guardian of public
freedom, and expect the Supreme Court, as in Chief Justice Earl War-
ren's time, to take the lead in vindicating the Bill of Rights. 50 Conserva-
tives, on the other hand, regard separation of powers as the principal
means with which to guard American freedom. 51 Separation of powers
entails the dispersion of power among the branches, in order to guard
145. See generally Biskupic, Justice Kennedy: The Fifth Vote, 47 Cong. Q. 1695 (July
8, 1989)(discussing Justice Kennedy's voting record).
146. See Biskupic, Solid New Majority Evident as 1988-89 Term Ends, 47 Cong. Q.
1694 (July 8, 1989).
147. Stewart, The Great Persuader, 76 A.B.A. J. 58 (Nov. 1990).
148. See id.
149. See generally Cohen, More Myths of Parity: State Court Forums and Constitu-
tionalActionsfor the Right to Shelter, 38 Emory L.J. 615, 615 (1989)(discussing the crea-
tion of a state constitutional right to shelter).
150. In this regard, the Court's most important historical decisions have been in the
protection of free speech, the franchise, and the electoral process. See Pierce, The Role of
the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U L. Rev. 1239,
1240 (1989). Compare Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 451 (1875)(contracts to lobby Con-
gress unenforceable) with United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954)(limits of
lobbying registration statute).
151. See Gelfand & Werhan, Federalism and Separation of Powers on a "Conservative"
Court: Currents and Cross-Currents From Justices O'Connor and Scalia, 64 Tul. L. Rev.
1443, 1444 (1990). Two related concerns of conservatives are those of factionalism and
those of aggrandizement. See generally Pierce, supra note 150, at 1244-50 (discussing the
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against any branch of government aggrandizing itself at the expense of
another or of the people.152 The Federalists believed dispersion of polit-
ical control was best accomplished by keeping each branch independent
from control by the other, and by maintaining a specialization of each
branch so that government could not operate without the assent of all
three. 153
Until the New Deal, the Supreme Court engaged separation of powers
issues primarily through the "nondelegation" doctrine, limiting the
amount of legislative authority Congress could delegate to an administra-
tive agency." Since then, the federal nondelegation doctrine has fallen
into abeyance. In sorting out separation of powers cases, the Court has
expressed itself most forcefully in those cases touching on the areas of
major political turbulence in the national government. The Court's anal-
ysis in such cases rests on two distinct approaches: 1" a "formalist" ap-
proach' 56 and a "functionalist" approach. 157
Formalism looks to a strict separation of the three branches, with in-
termingling only as prescribed by the Constitution's rule of law, to ac-
complish dispersion of political control.' The question here is, has
there been aggrandizement of one branch with respect to another?"5 9
Functionalism, on the other hand, looks to an ad hoc accommodation
among the three branches so that effective government can take place
while preserving the dispersion of political power at the minimum consti-
tutionally-required level. As such, functionalism is perhaps more of a
"checks and balances" approach than a "separation of powers" ap-
proach. 'I It is of necessity ad hoc, and is more compatible with theories
changing role of Congress in government policy-making). Factionalism and aggrandize-
meat threaten the people with minoritarian and majoritarian domination. See it at 1241.
152. See Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts
Under Article III, 65 Ind. LJ. 233, 271. See also hi. at 272 (the courts have been particu-
larly concerned about Congressional aggrandizement).
153. See Yassky, supra note 53, at 431, 433.
154. See id. at 431, 433-35.
155. See id at 435.
156. See Sherry, Separation of Powers." Asking a Different Question, 30 Win. & Mary L
Rev. 287, 289-93 (1989); Levinson, supra note 58, at 527-30. For a definition of formal-
ism, see Note, Separation of Power" A New Look at the Functionalist Approach, 40 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 331, 335-36 (1989-90). See also Entin, supra note 53, at 219-20 (for an
argument that the formalist approach comports with advocacy of limited government).
157. See Entin, supra note 53, at 206-09. For a definition of functionalism, see Note,
supra note 156, at 333-35. See also Entin, supra note 53, at 220-22 (for an argument that
the functionalist approach comports with advocacy of expanded government).
158. The formalist cases are associated with the Burger Court, essentially trying to
hold the line as an increasingly Democratic Congress began to assert its interest in con-
trolling the bureaucracy. See Schwartz, Curiouser and Curiouser: The Supreme Court's
Separation of Powers Wonderland, 65 Notre Dame L Rev. 587, 596-601 (1990). It has
been argued that the formalist cases involve in their fact patterns specific violations of the
constitutional text. See Bator, supra note 152, at 272.
159. See Gelfand & Werhan, supra note 151, at 1464.
160. Separation of powers is violated when the "[challenged action] prevents the [af-
fected] Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions." Bator, supra
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of pluralism. 161 The question here is whether the balance of power
among the three branches has been disturbed.
1 62
Maintaining separation of powers boundaries is not an easy task for
the Court, particularly when turf battles between the two directly ac-
countable branches are involved.1 63 Recently, however, the Court seems
to be showing more enthusiasm for enforcing separation of powers prin-
ciples through litigation. It has thus become more typical for the Court
to police the role of Congress and the President in overseeing the federal
agencies constituting the Bureaucracy. 164
Congressional oversight of agency action has been hampered by the
decentralization of authority to myriad subcommittees, the breakdown of
party discipline in Congress1 65 and the consequently enhanced power of
staff and lobbyists.1 66 In fact, Congress has been delegating more and
more authority to the agencies, particularly though a process described
by one commentator as "intransitive" legislation. 67 Attempts by Con-
gress to re-assert control through nonlegislative mechanisms have been
turned back by the Court,1 6s ostensibly because the possibility of legisla-
tive aggrandizement and the danger of factionalism would increase.69
The President (working through the Executive Office) has been some-
what more successful in getting the bureaucracy to do his bidding. The
President himself can hire and fire the Departmental Chiefs of the non-
independent agencies. 170 The Office of Management and the Budget
("OMB"), part of the Executive Office of the President, has the power to
review agency statements, proposals and regulations pursuant to its
power over the agencies' budgets. 71 A variety of other executive agen-
note 152, at 273 (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen'l Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443
(1984)).
161. Some argue that the functionalist approach enhances the representation of diffuse
interests by impartial bureaucratic managers, free from the influence of "special inter-
ests." See generally, Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29
(1985)(broad discussion of the influence of factions on the political process).
162. See Gelfand & Werhan, supra note 151, at 1464.
163. See Entin, supra note 53, at 209-27.
164. See Yackle, Choosing Judges the Democratic Way, 69 B.U.L. Rev. 273, 281 n.26
(1989).
165. See K. Lawson & P. Merkl, supra note 96, at 285-90.
166. See Pierce, supra note 150, at 1242-43, 1244-47. Congress has also been weak-
ened by the breakdown in party discipline effected through electoral reform and the rise
of PACs. See id at 1246.
167. See id. at 1244-47. See also De Long, supra note 54, at 425-27 (discussing
problems of determining congressional intent of statutory directives to agencies).
168. See, eg., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (executive authority lodged in
office controlled by Congress); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (legislative veto).
The theory seems to be that Congress' power ends with the passage of a law. "Implemen-
tation must to be left to officials who are not subject to direct congressional control."
Kramer, The Constitution as Architecture: A Charette, 65 Ind. L.J. 283, 288 n.18 (1990).
169. See Pierce, supra note 150, at 1249 & n.55.
170. See Delong, supra note 54, at 412.
171. See id. at 412.
The OMB was established to bring order out of the policy and financial chaos that
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cies which ultimately report to the President also influence agency
action. 17
2
The courts, however, in addition to being able to police Congressional
and Presidential oversight, also have the power to conduct their own pro-
cedural and substantive review of agency action. 173 Court involvement
in this area, directed by the APA and focusing on procedural regularity,
compliance with statutory mandate and abuse of discretion, 17' has be-
come the hope of many liberals for the extension of New Deal-type regu-
lation in the face of deregulatory strategies from conservative
Presidents. 175
These liberal hopes were localized in the once-liberal D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals. The D.C. Circuit invented the doctrine of "statutory
duty" to keep agencies cleaving to the line of '60s social welfare legisla-
tion, bolstering them against deregulatory Presidents. 76  Eventually,
"judicialized" and "following statutory duty," the agencies could have
been freed from accountability to the President and could have followed
a liberal, regulatory, "New Property" agenda."'7
Liberal theorists such as Professor Sunstein were apparently not per-
suaded that such agencies would run amok, balancing against that possi-
bility the benefits of strict judicial review to ensure that agencies adhere
to their statutorily-mandated duty.17 8 They seemed to believe that agen-
cies could be made to serve the public interest rather than respond to
special interests. The method was to permit the D.C. Circuit Court to
interpret an agency's statutory mandates and to precipitate a dialogue
with the various interests at stake, thus setting in motion a process of
reasoned decisionmaking. 1 9
The D.C. Circuit Court, it was hoped, would grant a "preferred posi-
tion" for minorities and others who have been given New Property rights
(e.g., the elderly in terms of Social Security), ' ° and would also prevent
special interest groups from capturing an agency. Through this process,
the New Property could perhaps be purged of its "special-interest" cor-
ruption. New Legal Process theorists apparently believed that purging
was achievable through collaboration with the once-liberal D.C. Circuit
reigned in the Capitol in the 1960s. Reagan's E.O. 12,291 dramatically increased OMB's
power. This was followed by E.O. 12,498, which acted as an "early warning" system,
requiring agencies to notify OMB of any significant intelligence-gathering. See Morrison,
OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99
Harv. L. Rev. 1059, 1060-63 (1986).
172. See DeLong, supra note 54, at 412-13.
173. See id. at 411.
174. See id. at 417.
175. See Shapiro, supra note 54, at 484-88.
176. See id. at 488.
177. See id
178. See Sunstein, supra note 161, at 64. See also Shapiro, supra note 54, at 468 (sum-
mary of Sunstein's theory).
179. See Shapiro, supra note 54, at 484-85.
180. See C. Reich, supra note 3, at 734-46.
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Court. Thus, the agencies would operate as a fourth branch of govern-
ment and "do the right thing" regardless of deregulationist pressures
from the Executive or "special-interest" regulation from Congress.181
The process of transformative appointments has reached even the lib-
eral D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, however. Recent decisions give the
lie to Professor Sunstein's hopes. Even if the D.C. Circuit Court had not
been transformed, however, it is likely that agencies with freedom from
political accountability would respond to tightly-organized special inter-
ests rather than serve the diffuse interests of the public. As mentioned
above, bureaucrats have their own reasons for responding to holders of
"special-interest" New Property. The degree of agency independence
thus remains a key issue."8 2
H. Public Interest Lawyering in the "Real World"
It is now conceded by many conservatives that less government will
not necessarily cure the social and economic problems of a democratic
society. 83 There is need to protect the people from the aggrandizement
of any branch of government, but there is also a need to promote govern-
ment activity that is required to protect the "diffuse interests" of the pub-
lic in values such as civil rights, civil liberties, environmental protection,
and pure food and drugs. While a hamstrung government cannot act to
favor a faction, it also cannot act to protect the people from the en-
croachment of the private sector.
By the same token, more government isn't necessarily the answer
either, particularly when the government itself is undisciplined and out
of control. As a gap widens between the cost of government and the
revenues available to pay for it, more and more members of the public
181. See Shapiro, supra note 54, at 479.
182. There are important questions to be raised about which of these institutions is
best suited to control agency action, questions which should be considered in light of the
particular agency function sought to be affected and the particular value sought to be
achieved. For example, how do procedural justice and error tolerance intersect? See
DeLong, supra note 54, at 415. Which is best for the task of control, the judicial focus on
fairness and procedure? The Office of Management and the Budget ("OMB") emphasis
on spending cuts? See id. at 424-25. See also Morrison, supra note 171, at 1067 (OMB
operates in secrecy); id. at 1071 (Congress, by amending the Administrative Procedure
Act or by rider to OMB's appropriations, should prohibit OMB review of agency deci-
sion-making except through on-the-record comments). The legalism of the Department
of Justice? See DeLong, supra note 54, at 419-20. The Executive Office of the President?
See id. at 425.
In some instances, the Court might do well to take note of the possibility that other
institutions might better regulate an agency in a particular context. For example, courts
are particularly inadept at agency control problems involving coordination of different
programs, resolution of interagency conflicts, and conflicts between specific congressional
directives and broader expressions of national policy. See id. at 424. By contrast, courts
perform well with delegation and due process issues. See id. at 425. See also id. at 418
(discussing the internal processes of the agency rather than the procedures by which it
ministers to the outside world).
183. See Kahn, supra note 39, at 15-17, for citations to such conservative views.
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have become concerned with the cost of the bureaucracy, what it does,
and for whom.
But how is that attention to be focused? In the S&L instance, it would
be fair to say that members of the "diffuse," scattered public are too
remotely connected to what is going on to recognize the direct impact
government policy choices have on their personal well-being. The opera-
tion of the media--dramatizing, personalizing and fragmenting the
news-makes it even more difficult for the public to get a firm grip on
such issues.
The role of a social movement in countering this disaffection is to ex-
pose the issue, empowering individuals to grapple with it through com-
munication, education and coalition-building. This type of exposure
should take place, if possible, before the crisis occurs. It may be too late
to raise questions once the money is lost and disbursed into the economy,
once the troops are committed, once a community is choked by cancer
from toxic waste, and once the diffuse public has committed itself to a
distorted, media-generated vision of the issues. The need for lawyers to
aid social movements in defending the "diffuse" interests of the public
requires that we develop both a theory and a practice of public interest
law. 184
The New Legal Process, an intellectual movement aiming to revive
Legal Process rationality in the face of CLS and Public Choice critiques,
seems to be in search of a source of public values other than the Old
Property in its naked, nonregulated state, or in the "special-interest"
garb it has donned to exploit the New Property. 8 5 Because the public
itself is diffuse, New Legal Process thinkers have apparently not seen a
way for the public to become constructively involved in policymaking.
Rather, they have focused on one or the other branch of government as
leader of a hermeneutic dialogue which would perhaps offset the ten-
dency of any one branch to degenerate into a forum for Old Property or
"special-interest" New Property. 18 6 They have generally not recognized
that the diffuse interests of the public can sometimes be discerned
through contact with social movements, perhaps confusing social move-
ments and the resultant public interest organizations with undesirable
"special interests."
184. See N. Reich, supra note 1, at i. Lawyers are a necessity because we are moving
into what Ulrich Beck calls the "risk society" of chaos and atomization (with a need for
networking in an information, as opposed to a mass, economy). See id. at ii (citing U.
Beck, Risikogesellsehaft Auf demwegineine andene Moderne (Frankfurt 1987)). See aLso
id. at ii (citing Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 Law &
Soc'y Review 239 (1983)).
185. See McDougall, Social Movements, supra note 9, at 98-101.
186. See generally Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the
Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 691 (1987)(focusing on the legislature); Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739 (1982)(focusing on the judiciary);
Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 Va. L. Rev.
271 (1988)(focusing on the bureaucracy).
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Movements for civil rights, consumer's rights, and a better environ-
ment are the closest thing we have to an unadulterated expression of the
public interest, however. Because of the corruption of the New Prop-
erty/regulatory system by "special interests," the diffuse interests of the
public cannot be left to a hermeneutic dialogue among the branches of
government. Instead, social movements have surrogates that operate in
the public policy system-the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights,
various Nader organizations pursuing consumer interests, various envi-
ronmental organizations-whose influence can only be appreciated when
examining the overall process by which law is developed and imple-
mented. To appreciate the role of social movements in legal discourse,
we must get beyond simply studying law "as it is."
The key lies in an examination of the role of law in the conflict be-
tween "special interests" and "diffuse interests." According to Norbert
Reich,I 7 in the chaos of post-modem society, law is neither an "autono-
mous" force, as the Formalists and holders of the Old Property would
have us believe, nor the rational instrument of social engineering envi-
sioned by the Realists, Legal Process adherents and advocates of the
New Property. Law is, instead, a forum for the management of con-
ffict 188 Law does not resolve conflict, but rather, manages it.
Considering law as a forum for the management of social conflict, we
can begin to examine the development and implementation of law
through a process of confrontation and clash between representatives of
diffuse interests, on the one hand, and powerful adversaries holding
either Old Property or "special-interest" New Property on the other.8 9
I have commented on this role of law elsewhere."9
When a social movement, seeking to assert diffuse interests in the face
of abuse by an Old or "special-interest" New Property holder, pressures
the state for some form of legal intervention (regulation, legislation, adju-
187. See N. Reich, supra note 1, at xxvii-xxxii.
188. See id. at xxiv.
"Certain participants in the community process have deprived, or are threatening to
deprive, other participants of claimed values, and one or both sets of participants, threat-
ening as well as threatened, may appeal to the process of community authority to facili-
tate or restrain the deprivation." McDougal, supra note 17, at 57. See also Clune, supra
note 15, at 58-61 (discussing the struggle between "social movements" (representing "dif-
fuse" interests) and "regulated organizations" ("special interests")).
189. See generally N. Reich, supra note 1, at xxix (citing Clune, Legal Disintegration
and a Theory of the State, in Working Papers, Series 2/5, 26 (1987)(available from the
Institute for Legal Studies, Madison, WI)).
Rights of special interest groups have a tendency to become privileges. These
privileges enjoy a broad constitutional and legal protection without being coun-
terbalanced by social responsibility and solidarity .... They are directed against
those who want social change .... [It is] "a ludicrous model of social planning,
pitting members of the collective against each other in a haphazard series of
disorganized, egoistical contests which disrupt social bonds and overextend the
total amount of collective resources.
Id at xxxii.
190. See McDougall, Social Movements, supra note 9, at 109-15.
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dication, executive order, or treaty), it gets a "compromise."'' The
state, "relatively autonomous" from the will of social actors, must incor-
porate into its intervention the interests of those whose behavior the so-
cial movement seeks to regulate, the "diffuse interests" represented by
the social movement, and the state's own institutional agenda. In this
pragmatic universe, a compromise is the best the social movement can
hope for.1 9
2
Such compromises are ephemeral legal patterns which manage conflict
by regulating the intensity the conflict will thenceforth take. The com-
promise prescribes the instruments which can be deployed by either side
as the conflict ensues. Typically, the compromise also identifies a forum
to which the adversaries may turn for technical--or even radical-refine-
ments in the original legal pattern.1 93 This perception of the law's man-
agement function can be expanded by viewing the adversaries as free to
address related claims to other forums. Thus, we see adversaries moving
strategically and tactically among courts, legislatures, regulatory agen-
cies, the media, and chief executive officers on federal, state, and munici-
pal level. This is the "recursiveness" and "cybernetic interactionism"
described by Clune in his 1983 work.19' This is a moving picture of law
as an "object, product, and determinant" of social conflict.1 95
Norbert Reich is concerned especially with the collective and individ-
ual "action rights" which make legal forums available to social move-
ments as a procedural matter. 96 In his view, these are essential to enable
191. See Clime, supra note 15, at 88-89.
192. For a definition of "compromise," see id at 88.
193. For an example of this process, see McDougall, Social Movements, supra note 9,
at 111-15 (recursive and cybernetic interaction of Leadership Conference on Civil Rights,
special interest groups, and the Reagan Administration in the passage of the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1988).
194. See Clime, supra note 15, at 78.
[O]ifcials and representatives of effective control groups are both continuously
gathering and disseminating information or intelligence for the enlightenment
of the authoritative prescribers and appliers of policy and continuously recom-
mending specific policies to such prescribers and appliers .... By still different
procedures [they are also] in constant process of appraising and terminating
outmoded prescriptions.
McDougal, supra note 17, at 57.
Decisions are responses to precipitating events best described as value changes
in social processes, are conditioned by many different variables in the particular
social processes in which they occur, and have in turn continuing effects upon
such processes.
Id at 65.
195. See Wright, Modes of Political Class Struggle in the Capitalist State, 4/5 Kapitali-
state 186 (1976).
196. The various civil rights acts and the environmental protection statutes are good
examples. Note "private attorneys general" provisions of much of the legislation. Note
also the proposition that "rights are only abstractions until they affect human behavior."
McDougall, The New Property, supra note 91, at 400. The process of translating 'rights'
into altered behavior patterns is a complex and indeterminate one. See id. at 402-03.
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a social movement to protect itself from losses in the political arena.'97
Public interest litigators are finding it increasingly difficult, however, to
gain access to federal courts to protect such rights by adjudication. Even
those courts which are sympathetic to public interest views often cannot
hear such claims because of the increasingly restrictive law of standing
issues being promulgated by the Supreme Court. In fact, public interest
litigators may do well to avoid federal court even if they can gain stand-
ing, as the Court shows every sign of returning to the kind of conserva-
tive judicial activism that has been characteristic of the Court for most of
its history.
Further, too much reliance on legal forums (especially courts) and in-
sufficient political action (electoral and non-electoral, in communities
and neighborhoods as well as statewide and nationwide coalitions) will
enervate a social movement and render it ineffectual in both the political
and the legal realm. The social movement's legitimacy to speak in the
legal forum is precarious; it depends on the perception of the state appa-
ratus-primarily legislative, but also regulatory and judicial-that the
social movement commands the allegiance of the diffuse interests it pur-
ports to represent.' 98 A social movement is not like a union, representing
workers as the result of an election. 199 It must constantly re-establish its
legitimacy, both with the diffuse public it purports to represent and the
legal functionaries whose intervention it seeks.o° It's quite a tightrope to
walk.20 1
III. PUBLIC INTEREST REPRESENTATION: MODES OF ANALYSIS
AND ACTION
A. Introduction
We have examined the theories of law that comprehend its open-ended
197. See N. Reich, supra note 1, at xxxiii.
198. This is complicated by the fact that social movements, unlike unions, are "not
organi[z]ed on a large membership basis. They need 'selective incentives'. . . to avoid
'free riding.' Therefore, they seemingly do not enjoy democratic legitimacy but are still
necessary to allow for the pursuit of the quality of life." Id. at xxvii.
199. N. Reich calls these "reform rights." See id. at xxxvi.
[S]ocial movements for the protection of diffuse interests usually fall outside
traditional legal arrangements which are based on a government of laws pro-
tecting highly specific "subjective rights." The only exception so far has been
the recognition of collective rights to trade unions .... Nothing comparable is
available in other areas of social conflict, such as environmental, consumer, and
equal rights protection.
Ido at xxvii.
200. See generally N. Reich, supra note 1, at xxxvi (summarizing the various compet-
ing rights among members of industrialized societies). An advantage of reading a Euro-
pean author here is that his references to what Charles Reich refers to as the "new
property" also include the more thoroughgoing experiments at legal intervention in the
economy attempted by the socialist countries. See also id. at xxx; Clune, supra note 15, at
78 (definition of "reformist political fabrication").
201. See McDougall, Social Movements, supra note 9, at 98 & nn. 91-94; N. Reich,
supra note 1, at xxviii.
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character and that take note of the contribution of the various sources of
law to the corpusjuris of the legal system. We have discussed the theo-
ries of law that comprehend the development and implementation of law,
as well as "what the law is." But we have not yet considered how a
public policy approach requires teaching students different lawyering
skills to cope with the world we describe. To what extent do clinical
teaching methods enhance learning and teaching about advocacy in legis-
lative, regulatory and litigation contexts? The remainder of this Article
is devoted to these questions.
1. Ends-Means Thinking
For clinical legal educators working with clients, the practical and
pedagogical issue is how to solve the client's problem. The clinician's
education leads him or her to consider court judgments as the only legal
arrangements which have the kind of permanence or stability that can
put a client's problem "to rest." In practice, however, the clinician be-
gins to discover two important variations from his or her law school
training.
First, court judgments are less permanent, and legislation or regula-
tion2 02 more permanent, than previously assumed. Judicial precedents
are not completely permanent--even the Supreme Court occasionally
reverses itself-and constituencies pieced together in a legislative coali-
tion are not completely ephemeral. Coalitions around certain legisla-
tion-such as the National Labor Relations Act-have stood the test of
time longer than some Supreme Court opinions.2°3
Second, legislation and regulation are more the product of a "rational"
process than heretofore assumed, and court judgments are less the out-
come of a "rational" process than previously assumed. The very process
by which precedents are synthesized into a "judgment" or rule, especially
at the appellate and Supreme Court levels, is much more like legislation
than we tend to realize. 2'
We are looking here at the possibility that precedent (litigation, appel-
late practice), legislative coalition (legislative practice), oversight coali-
tion (regulatory practice) and consensus (mediation and negotiation) are
perhaps not so dissimilar as we have previously maintained. They might
be better characterized as points on a continuum. The ends-means think-
ing that is appropriate in the "post-modem" legal universe requires that
202. A discussion of mediation and negotiation is beyond the scope of this article.
203. Whenever the balance of forces undergirding the National Labor Relations Act is
disturbed, a "watershed" occurs and a perception of injustice arises. Cf Klare, Judicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness 1937-
1941, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 290-91 (1978)(the same analysis with respect to the Wagner
Act).
204. Cf R. Woodward, The Brethren 2-3 (1979)(describing the seven decision-making
steps used by the Supreme Court). Also, judgments have only an illusion of finality. Cf.
Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. I (1979)(on the structural injunction).
1991]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
we consider this varied pattern of sources of law and forums from which
to get legal remedies, and understand the characteristics of each.
2. Contingency Planning/Comparative Risk Evaluation
A public policy approach helps students to see the impact and influ-
ence of social movements and the role of the media in setting the institu-
tional agenda for society as a whole.2"5 These and other forces converge
to create a social and institutional environment in which certain out-
comes are more or less likely to emerge.
In the post-modern legal universe, we have thus begun to move away
from the idea of law as frozen in appellate court opinions, and toward a
process which is constantly in motion. State intervention does not end a
conflict, it merely frames it, confines it within acceptable boundaries,
and, within those boundaries, the conflict continues.
The question that the student and practitioner must ask in this context
is: "How do we activate the legal apparatus of the state to respond to a
client's problem?" What is the best forum? The judiciary, the legislature,
or an administrative agency?" There are clearly situations in which liti-
gation is not the right instrument to use for achieving a certain objective,
and legislation (broad sweep) or regulation (case by case or rulemaking)
is more appropriate.2 °" Once law is seen as the structural result or out-
come of a drive for state intervention, we can begin to treat judgment,
legislation, and regulation as equally available remedies.2"7
3. Hypothesis Formulation/Information Acquisition
Now that alternate forums are being considered, what skills should be
developed for effective advocacy in each? Legal reasoning in a litigation
context requires the marshalling of precedent. The litigator has to frame
the issue so that available precedents will be pieced together in a pattern
that "covers" the problem at hand. In a legislative context, legal reason-
ing requires the marshalling of arguments that will command the loyal-
ties of diverse constituencies, which can in turn be built into a coalition
large enough to sponsor, or even perhaps pass, the bill. In a regulatory
context, legal reasoning requires an examination of statutory authority
and internal agency decisionmaking processes as well as an ability to re-
sort to both litigation-specific and legislation-specific legal reasoning if
either the courts or the legislature are to be invoked to externally control
agency action.
Language and proposals have to be drafted around which a coalition
can be formed and which can keep the coalition in a pattern that "cov-
205. See generally D. Graber, supra note 64, at 119-24 (impact of media on societal
behavior).
206. 193. See generally McDougall, Lawyering, supra note 9, at 379-83 (theoretical
perspectives about the law).
207. See McDougall, Social Movements, supra note 9, at 115.
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ers" the problem at hand. For such language to be drafted, information
must be retrieved, aggregated and formulated into hypotheses that can
convince a broad array of persons affected by the "problem" to see their
common interests in addressing it.
Advocates who are assigned tasks of data retrieval and analysis must
know how to work with data. They must develop a sense of what is
available and learn how to use sources such as statistics, public records,
corporate reports and the Freedom of Information Act." Moreover,
ethical questions come up in data collection: How scrupulous should the
collector be? How ethical should the collector be in terms of research
and presentation?
In what form should data or the conclusions drawn from data be
presented? There are essentially two approaches, empirical and anecdo-
tal. Anecdotes can provide a profile of the problem, sum it up, evoke it.
Anecdotes are especially important from a media standpoint, but an ad-
vocate may never get to present an anecdote to a decisionmaker unless a
factual predicate can be established. The advocate must first be prepared
to prove that the anecdotal information is expressive of a larger pat-
tern-a "big" problem, the solution to which will have a "big" impact.
We thus see a need for skill in data collection, retrieval and aggrega-
tion, particularly by statistical and other empirical methods needed to
prove that a problem exists and that it touches many people ("left brain"
techniques). The practitioner will also require a kind of "right brain"
empathy, sensitivity and creativity to distill that data into a compelling
paradigm, story, or even anecdote which will evoke the necessary com-
prehensive understanding of the problem identified. These are skills
which should be seen as "agenda-setting" as much as they are "advo-
cacy." Far from the Lone Ranger paradigm of the lawyer, our role in
pursuit of the public interest-in judicial as well as legislative and regula-
tory forums-is much more that of enabler than of decision-maker.
4. "Building Community" and "Right-Brain" Skills'
The skills employed in negotiation, mediation, networking, consensus
and coalition-building are the skills of building community. These com-
munities may be built among a small group or a very large group of
people; the communities may be lasting, or they may be ephemeral.
What I wish to touch on here is the relevance of right-brain "skills" like
empathy and the ability to see patterns and connections to such commu-
nity-building.
Graham Strong seems to be the pioneer on Right Brain Lawyering.21
Graham's recent draft, "The Lawyer's Left Hand-Non-Analytic
208. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1991).
209. See McDougall, Lawyering, supra note 9, at 374, 383-84; McDougall, Social
Movements, supra note 9, at 93 nn. 58-60, 96-97.
210. See also Lipkin, supra note 1, at 867-71 (legal and moral theory construction).
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Thought in the Practice of Law," is apparently confined to the context of
litigation, and sees the lawyer as working alone. While Graham seeks to
develop intuitive skills to make a lawyer a better interviewer and counsel-
lor, for example, he still sees the lawyer as a litigator, one man against all
odds. These aspects are very much part of the Langdellian paradigm he
attacks, and reveals how much of that paradigm still dominates the
thinking of most clinicians.
The key to breaking out of the Langdellian paradigm is not simply to
release the right brain so that we can, as individuals, serve our clients
better. It is to release the "ego boundaries" which make us not only, in
the final analysis, unable to conceive of solutions other than those which
involve litigation or actions leading to it, but even make it difficult for us
to conceive of litigation remedies which we do not personally author and
control.21
A collapse of ego boundaries enables us to merge our work with that of
others through networking, first within the litigation realm, and then
across litigation, regulation and legislation.212 This is how the coalitions
are built which bring together "diffuse" interests and create the social
movements which are one of our most important sources of public val-
ues. Social movements can actually be inhibited by a "Lone Ranger"
style of litigation; the networking and interaction which is necessary to
advance a legislative agenda, for example, builds community in a way
that victories by a single litigator, no matter how important, cannot cre-
ate. Further, if members of the public are not actively involved, the so-
cial movement loses credibility and influence. We thus must begin to
prepare ourselves and our students to see lawyers' roles as facilitating the
trusteeship of diffuse interests exercised by social movements.
Once we are prepared to work with others in a collaborative workstyle,
there are a number of right-brain skills which are very useful in the kind
of coalition-building which is necessary for legislative and "implementa-
tion" practice. One is the ability to see patterns intuitively, even artisti-
cally, where others strive for detail, "missing the forest for the trees." 213
Another is the ability to sense and pick up connections between people
and causes based on prior experience. 214
Further, administrative and legislative advocates learn to attack a
211. See Solomon, Client Relations: Ethics and Economics, 23 Ariz. St. L. J. 155, 180-
81 (1991).
212. Note that ego boundaries tend to reify personality variants, shared by all, into
"reactionary, conservative, liberal, and radical" dispositions. Cf Lipkin, supra note 1, at
871-74 (a sort of "Myers-Briggs" conception of political personality type). Once a polit-
ical disposition is thus formed, the political ego is subject to flattery, threat and manipula-
tion just as the social ego is. See id.
213. For example, analytical versus associational or networking skills, or legal draft-
ing, which cannot be too clearly expressed without fractionating coalitions or obscuring
issues. Cf. Lipkin, supra note 1, at 868-70 (linear thinking versus required "fuzzy logic");
Margulies, supra note 95, at 236 (impact of diagnostic thinking on paradigms and human
inference).
214. See G. Bellow & B. Moulton, The Lawyering Process 299-301 (1987).
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problem, rather than an opponent, and learn to seek compromises. Com-
promises are facilitated in their conceptualization by right-brain skills,
and in their execution by a collapse of ego boundaries. Administrative
and legislative "compromises" are economic/political/legal equilibria
which are, in truth, "communities," even if only short-lived. Perhaps
classroom and clinical teachers and scholars can begin to see that court
judgments are equilibria as well, constantly being calibrated and re-cali-
brated. Just as litigators make choices between solving problems by go-
ing "all the way" to judgment, legislative advocates make choices about
going "all the way" to getting a bill passed. In either case, tactics short
of full-blown strategies may be preferable in order to sustain informal,
"community" relationships which may ultimately be as important as
"high-megaton" state sanctions in altering patterns of social life at the
most basic level. Thus, public interest lawyers may frequently find them-
selves looking for negotiations, compromises, and settlements which are
on the litigation or legislation track but which do not go all the way to
the end of the line.
Interviews with public interest lawyers regarding relevant lawyering
skills in this type of practice reveal a preference for negotiation 1 5 and
networking skills,2" 6 with less focus on the litigation-related skills of re-
search, writing and advocacy.2 7 They are also concerned not only with
the question of which skill to use but how and when to use it.218 Public
interest lawyers also caution that coalition work is not all right-brain,
"touchy-feely" stuff.2 "9 A public interest lawyer not only builds coali-
215. [T~he needed skills are meeting facilitation, coalition building, empathy,
knowing when to hold a tough position and when to make a deal. Our work
needs people who care about taking positions carefully, being as substantively
correct as possible. Less ego grandstanding would help too.
Letter from Barbara J. Bramble, Director, International Program, National Wildlife Fed-
eration to Prof. Harold A. McDougall (Oct. 29, 1990)(letter on file with author).
216. A good public policy lawyer can network with peers, agency personnel, and con-
stituencies of organizations/participants in coalitions to garner support for a particular
position. See Letter from Dierdre Halloran, Associate General Counsel, U.S. Catholic
Conference, to Prof. Harold A. McDougall (Oct. 26, 1990)(letter on file with author).
217. Telephone and letter interviews conducted with thirty public interest lawyers be-ginning October 1, 1990. (names and correspondence on file with author).
218. For me the most difficult task is determining [how] the... skills I possess
should be brought to bear. Sometimes it is right to negotiate amicably; at other
times, only hard-ball litigation will do. The hardest job I have is determining
which general course to follow. Though many cases are clear a larger number
are in a grey area. In particular I need to... overcome my own conciliatory
tendencies.
Letter from Paul Rosenzweig, Assistant Attorney General, Environmental & Natural
Resources Division, Environmental Crimes section, to Prof. Harold A. McDougall (Oct.
26, 1990)(letter on file with author).
219. Alan Houseman, of the Center for Law and Social Policy, offered these observa-
tions on coalition work, based on eighteen years of experience in Washington:
1. Organization and staff are key. To be effective, a Coalition must have orga-
nizational backing and hardworking, thoughtful, knowledgeable and politically
astute staff. While accountability is important, particularly to coalition constit-
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tions, but he or she also services them, which is demanding work requir-
ing traditional as well as "post-modem" legal skills.
A lawyer representing a coalition needs to be aware of, and prepared
to accommodate, the internal review processes of various organizations
participating in a coalition. A good legislative or regulatory or litigation
product must be orchestrated and timely reviewed by all organizations
involved in the coalition before it is presented to a governmental deci-
sionmaker for action.220 Activity at this scale and level of complexity
makes efficient organization and able staff key elements in the coalition's
capacity to reach consensus on specific policies and positions.
Some advocates feel that coalition work is necessary to develop a
broad base for action, but complain that they spend too much time in
meetings. Behind every coalition, they say, are "a few workhorses who
know the issues technically, who know the [H]ill or agency players, who
work very hard, and who know how to marshal political support for
their positions." '221 Others stress the importance of developing and main-
taining an effective grass-roots network to keep the coalition accountable.
5. Modes of Public Interest Advocacy
a. Legislative Advocacy
Generally speaking, the legislative advocate needs to know the
processes, formal procedures, informal institutional dynamics, and appli-
uents and their members, the capacity to act quickly and make hard decisions is
even more important.
2. It is essential to reach conclusions on specific legislative positions or at least
the detailed framework within which the key actors can function. Coalitions
must have the staffing and take the time to reach conclusions, even if it creates
intense internal tension.
3. The coalition must have the capacity somewhere to draft specific legislation
reflecting the coalition position and such legislation must be realistic. And it
must have the ongoing capacity to respond immediately (without meetings) to
legislation and amendments proposed by committee staff or Members or other
interest groups.
4. The coalition must develop an effective grass roots network that is some-
what accountable to the coalition. There must be constant and effective com-
munication to the grass roots network and the network members must be given
specific, real, tasks to do which they can do.
5. The coalition must have the capacity to develop effective materials for com-
mittee staff and members, for coalition members, for grass roots people, and for
the press.
6. The coalition must generate press for its views and respond immediately to
negative press.
7. Except for general information meetings, coalition meetings must be fo-
cused on real issues and require real work from people who are participants.
Letter from Alan Houseman, Director, Center for Law and Social Policy, Washington,
D.C. to Prof. Harold A. McDougall (Nov. 5, 1990)(letter on file with author).
220. See Halloran, supra note 216. The process by which the Americans With Disabil-
ities Act was recently passed by Congress would make an excellent case study of this
process.
221. See Houseman, supra note 219.
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cable advocacy skills involved in shaping legislation both in the first in-
stance and as legislation evolves due to pressures from special interests,
advocates for the diffuse interests of the public, and other branches of
government.' m Also essential to effective legislative advocacy are an un-
derstanding of legislative protocol generally, and specifically that used in
the relevant committee or subcommittee, as well as a knowledge of the
key players on a committee or subcommittee.22 3 In addition, a sophisti-
cated sense of how to call on the media is always helpful.
One key area is the use of legislative history." 4 At what point will a
court consider legislative history in interpreting a statute?225 Will it con-
sider post-enactment legislative history? Where and how in the process
of drafting legislative history can the advocate make the greatest impact
in terms of later regulatory or judicial interpretation? Advocates need to
understand the specific legislative history of each section of a law upon
which their attention is focused and consider how the law came about
and who was involved in it.
As any Hill legislative advocate will attest, legislative staff are key
players in the process. It is very important to understand how powerful
staff are; they can make it nearly impossible to see their Member. An
advocate first has to convince key staffers before he or she can get to the
Member; the staffers are very protective, and some simply have their own
agendas. Advocates, then, as a matter of necessity, must develop a sense
of what sorts of things will capture a staffer's attention. For that, it is
important to know how the Member's positions are formed as a general
matter. A sense of what the Member's position on an issue has been in
the past can be invaluable, and can often be gleaned from legislative his-
tory if other sources of information are not available. This kind of infor-
mation is particularly helpful if the Member has a new staffer who wasn't
part of the original process. "I can't believe Senator Smith is no longer
with us on this issue," the advocate can say. An advocate who lacks such
knowledge can quickly lose credibility with a Member's staff.
Often, the only way an advocate can get around a staffer is to find what
constituent groups in the advocate's coalition have clout with the Mem-
ber. This points up the importance of local contacts, which should be
developed to enhance an advocate's ability to influence legislators and
even key agency personnel.
Especially today, local pressure from a broad variety of groups is far
more effective in many legislative situations than coalition lobbying
222. See AALS Section on Legislation Newsletter, Statement on Teaching Legislation
in Law Schools (December 1989).
223. Letter from Bill Magaven, U.S. Public Interest Research Groups, to Prof. Harold
A. McDougall (Nov. 1, 1990)(letter on file with author).
224. See Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper The Use of Legislative History in Construing Stat-
utes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 Am. U.L. Rev. 277, 306
(1990).
225. An interesting study could be made of the opinions of Justice Antonin Scalia on
the subject of the judicial use of legislative history.
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[done] in Washington.... Of course, broad-based Washington efforts
are essential to get major legislation passed or to prevent harmful legis-
lation from passing. But, the most effective efforts (at least on the do-
mestic policy side) arise from direct local pressure on Members, with
appropriate Washington follow-up.
226
A final area of interest is the use of testimony. When should members
of a public interest group, in particular, speak and what should they say?
A number of public interest group representatives have had the unfortu-
nate experience of having their testimony used against them in later liti-
gation or even in the same hearing.
b. Regulatory Advocacy
As a formal matter, the advocate should be able to draft regulatory
comments, which have a different focus and format than legislation. Cer-
tainly, in addition, a regulatory advocate must be able to follow an issue
from the legislative process through the regulatory process, concerning
himself or herself with the degree to which the legislative intent is being
carried out by the agency through its regulations. However, it is impor-
tant for advocates to be prepared to research regulatory agency decisions
from the inside as well as from the outside, with a particular emphasis on
the agency's informal, internal decisionmaking processes.
It is important to be able to follow the "paper trail" left by deci-
sionmakers within an agency, for example. An advocate wants to look at
the internal networking of the agency itself. Who wields real power? Is
it the commissioners or are they just figureheads? Does the staff make
decisions? Where are the pressure points?
An advocate becomes aware of these internal processes through infor-
mal channels, built up over time through networking. Developing con-
tacts inside agencies becomes very important. These contacts can give an
advocate the inside "scoop" on the approach an agency is likely to take
on a particular issue, where the agency is really heading, what it is look-
ing for.
At the same time, experience and inside contacts help the advocate to
locate the lower levels of agency documents on which agency deci-
sionmakers rely. These documents do not rise to the level of precedent
or regulation, but nonetheless they influence the agency's decision. Tax
is an example: there is the code and its regulations, but there are also
revenue rulings, private letter rulings and general counsel memoranda
which are not precedent. The advocate cannot cite them in court, but in
making a presentation to the agency, the advocate would want to be
aware of their existence and how they shaped the final agency decision.
226. Houseman, supra note 219.
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c. Public Interest Litigation 227
As with regulatory practice, there is some overlap between litigation
and legislation advocacy. Particularly with respect to legislation creating
a private right of action, or creating an entitlement, the legislative advo-
cate may confer with the litigator to determine the desired contours of
the right in question. What due process rights are desired, for example?
With respect to an entitlement, should reviewing courts be directed to
require extensive notice and an administrative hearing before the grant-
ing agency terminates the entitlement?
Probably the most important skill for a litigator representing a na-
tional public interest organization, such as the ACLU or NAACP, is the
ability to get familiar with the court in which he or she is called to bring
a case. State courts and federal district courts, in particular, have local
rules and pretrial procedures which an advocate must know to avoid be-
ing placed at a disadvantage. Other important information includes the
identity of members of the panel from which judges will be drawn.
Much of this information can be discovered by networking with local
lawyers or by sitting in on trials to get a sense of local community norms
and values and to identify the idiosyncracies of particular judges.
The ability to get familiar with a new court framework is particularly
essential to litigators representing social movements today, because "fo-
rum-shopping" has become increasingly important among both plaintiffs
and defendants. Many liberal public interest groups, aware of the in-
creasingly conservative cast of federal courts due to appointments by
Nixon, Reagan, and Bush, prefer to litigate in state courts on state law
and constitutional grounds.2 8 Liberal public interest lawyers litigating
in state courts pursuant to state legislation in some cases find that the
states have discrimination, environment, and consumer protection laws
that are more favorable to their cause than those found in the federal
system.' 9 Many states have an Equal Rights Amendment, for example,
which does not exist in federal jurisprudence.
On the other hand, lawyers who represent conservative opposition to
liberal public interest organizations often seek to take issues out of liberal
state courts and into conservative federal courts. These lawyers are using
the federal court system's removal statute,1 0 once used by civil rights
attorneys when the federal courts were more liberal than those of the
227. See generally Collins & Skover, supra note 48, at 198-212 (historical account of
how liberals have reacted to a conservative attempt to frame the nature of public law
discourse from the late nineteenth century to the present).
228. See Collins, The Once "New Judicial Federalism" & Its Critics, 64 Wash. L Rev.
5, 6 (1989); Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions: The Montana Disaster, 63 Tex. L
Rev. 1095, 1099-1100 (1985).
229. There are also variations in statutes of limitation, nature of available relief (e.g.,
injunction as opposed to damages) and the like, which might influence a litigator's choice
between state or federal court.
230. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1446 (1988).
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states.231 At the same time, lawyers for social movements and public
interest groups, particularly those operating on a national level, have be-
come adept at avoiding federal circuits in which "bad" law might be
created and sent up to the Supreme Court.
d. Lawyering and the Politics of Information
The public policy advocate should be attentive to the means of exert-
ing external pressure on media organizations, both to exert such pres-
sures and to counter pressure being exerted by opponents. In the short
run, public policy advocates representing social movements must be espe-
cially aware of the importance of monitoring the content of media pro-
grams and the importance of attaining greater coverage of selected
events.
In the long run, however, a network for the distribution and exchange
of intelligence must be built which can provide the "diffuse" public with
more access to information than they now have. Closer interaction with
public radio stations such as NPR and the Pacifica News Service are
critical to this effort. Churches, universities, and other institutions de-
voted to dialogue and exchange are essential as well.
Dependence on the media as an organizing tool, however, would, espe-
cially in the long run, be a grave mistake. The media will tend to select a
"hero" of the social movement, and the resultant concentration of atten-
tion on one individual will in turn undercut the organizational dynamics
and internal trust of the movement itself. On the other hand, the move-
ment itself may be depicted as "deviant," with similarly deleterious
effects.232
A prime task of the social movement's information network, then, is to
expose the biases of the media, its profit orientation, and the manner in
which its analysis and interpretation of the news is distorted by dramati-
zation and personalization.2 ss The network must also help and en-
courage individuals to develop their own analyses for sorting out
information.234
231. See generally Collins & Skover, supra note 48, at 216-19 (describing liberal trend
in state courts since the 1970s); see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)(Supreme
Court reaches out to reverse a liberal search and seizure decision based on state court's
citation of the Fourth Amendment, despite reliance of state court on state constitutional
grounds in deciding case). For comment, see Collins, Plain Statements: The Supreme
Court's New Requirement, 70 A.B.A. J. 92 (1984).
232. See L. Bennett, supra note 74, at 52, 60.
233. Cf Collins & Skover, supra note 48, at 198-201 (new legal conservatism move-
ment used the media to challenge liberal judges and interest groups to respond to the
issues raised).
234. The creation of new forms of legal scholarship and models to raise the level of





Public Choice theorists and Reagan deregulators sought to impose
some order on the chaos of the postmodern state by withdrawing govern-
ment from the equation. These forces are now beginning to concede that
the "politics of unregulation" may yield results as dismal as the politics
of regulation. They may well conclude that attempts at campaign fi-
nance reform, attempts to enforce ethical standards for legislators and
bureaucrats, and attempts to limit special interest distortion of the legis-
lative process may do more to correct the evils of our present system
"than one-sided limits on the role of government."'"
Public interest practitioners cannot place so much faith in rules, how-
ever. Implementation researchers who seek to support the efforts of pub-
lic interest lawyers and provide a context for training students who wish
to enter this field would do well to demonstrate, therefore, that post-
modem law does not progress in an orderly fashion and cannot be
"tamed" or rendered motionless by rules. At the same time, it is impor-
tant not to paint a picture that all is chaos, either. Unlike CLS, imple-
mentation researchers should not "aspire" to disorder. Rather, they
should try to help students understand the roots of disorder in the post-
modem system, how it developed, and where it is going, so they can
practice effectively in a disorderly context. This can be accomplished by
training students to see patterns and probabilities, continually appraise
possible directions and to be prepared to discern emerging outcomes.
Following and understanding the role of social movements is essential
to seeing and creating patterns in the chaos and disorder of contempo-
rary public interest lawyering. The interests of the public stand a greater
chance of being protected by social movements making the governing
process more accountable than by campaign finance reforms or other re-
straints designed to rein in an electoral and governing process that has
thus far been proven to be beyond the control and even the interest of the
voters. More attention needs to be paid to social movements as trustees
of the diffuse public interest in issues of economic well-being, social wel-
fare, civil rights and environmental balance. "6
At the outset, social movements were an attempt to represent diffuse
interests in the face of government management by myriad, and often
conflicting, "special interests." Social movements and the public interest
organizations which represent them may thus appear to be "special inter-
ests," because they, like the PACs and special interest lobbying groups,
are moving into the vacuum left by the erosion of the party structure." 7
Social movement and public interest requests for legal intervention are
235. Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice and Limits on Government, 75
Cornell L. Rev. 280, 312 (1990).
236. See generally McDougall, Social Movements, supra note 9, at 118-22 (the people,
expressing themselves through social movements ["diffuse interests"] as the source of
values in public discourse).
237. See McDougall, The New Property, supra note 91, at 404-07.
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entertained, however, because the government needs "legitimation
through protecting the public against health, environmental, or economic
risks."23 Thus, a social movement's "clout" depends upon the govern-
ment's perception that they have mobilized (or can mobilize) the "diffuse
interest" of the public in civil rights, environmental quality, and/or con-
sumer protection. The government will not respond to the social move-
ment if the movement's credibility with the "diffuse" public is so low that
the government does not thereby stand to gain any appreciable legitima-
tion benefit.
Even then, certain wings of the governing coalition, particularly those
which favor Old or "special-interest" New Property holders, will attempt
to discredit the movement. In other cases, the government will make
"symbolic" concessions to the movement which serve the government's
legitimation purposes but which will be subverted by special interests
who have captured the bureaucracy in charge of implementing the new
policy.
2 3 9
In one sense, the rise of social movements to protect the diffuse inter-
ests of the public in the policymaking process holds within it the seeds of
a more voluntaristic, communitarian approach to democracy in which
the business of constructing social life reverts increasingly to the people.
This might occur because of the "scorched earth" deregulatory policy of
the Reagan-Bush era. Or it could occur because social movements and
other voluntary associations find, stepping into the vacuum left by the
disappearance of the bureaucracy, that there are many things they would
simply rather not entrust to it even given the choice. Or it could be some
combination of both. Suffice it to say that the big question of bureau-
cracy-how can it be controlled-may give way to an even larger ques-
tion: how much of it do we actually need?
I am not arguing that social movements depart from the state forum
completely; at this point in history that would be stupid and danger-
ous.2" I also do not advocate the "rollback" of law to permit more so-
cial interaction (essentially a Public Choice/Deregulatory position).
What I do point out is that (1) unless the social movements build strong
community ties, and perhaps build strong community in the process,
they cannot expect to effectively pursue their legal goals in official gov-
ernment forums; (2) as these development and implementation coalitions
take on a life of their own and begin to discern ways in which they can
manage problems without going to the state as a matter of first resort,
they will become more powerful; and (3) the eventual emergence of a
238. N. Reich, supra note 1, at xxvi (citing Clune, Legal Disintigration and a Theory of
the State, at 16 in Working Papers, Series 2/5 (1987)(available from the Institute for
Legal Studies, Madison, WI)).
239. See id at xxvi.
240. But cf id. at v (proposition that "particular social sub-systems are better not dealt
with by law, since they thereby lose their specific characteristics or become
'colonised.' "). See also Gabel, supra note 32, at 370-72 (explaining the role of the legal
system as a means of making society's inhumane social order appear legitimate).
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strong public interest movement will not only place the "diffuse" inter-
ests of the public in a better bargaining position vis-a-vis the Old Prop-
erty and "special-interest" New Property, but will enable these diffuse
interests to be pursued independently of both.24
As we look at the deterioration of the economic and political under-
pinnings of the post-modem era, we as lawyers and teachers must begin
to prepare ourselves and our students to play a role in constituting the
democracy-political and economic-which can and should mark our
future. We must train ourselves and our students to create instruments
that can empower the values of our community and heighten the integ-
rity and comprehensiveness of public discourse.2 4 2 The values of access
and accountability, not merely rules or ethics, should be our touchstones.
For that, we will have to look not only beyond our roles as litigators, but
beyond our roles as lawyers. 43
241. See McDougall, The New Property, supra note 91, at 407-15, 417-18.
242. As discussed above, some of these basic skills include coalition-building, working
at consensus, a sense of humor, an appreciation of the values of access and accountability;
the willingness to "follow through" on an issue and "nail down" a solution. Cf. McDou-
gall, Social Movements, supra note 9, at 98-100, 118-22 (community building through the
new legal process). See also McDougall, The New Property, supra note 91, at 417-18
(describing a "New Community" comprised in part of community-based organizations).
243. The preceding may well create some controversy. For a discussion of how new
modes of legal action have created new lawyering roles, and the uneasiness with which
traditionalists in the profession confront those roles, see Clune, supra note 15, at 98-104.
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